[Election-Methods] RE : Re: RE : Re: rcv ala tournament

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sun Dec 30 06:44:21 PST 2007


--- Juho <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
> >> Approval is simple only if you find it convenient to ignore such
> >> questions
> >> as "how should a voter vote to best
> >> pursue his interests?"  If you happen to include such things in the
> >> equation, Approval mind-blowingly complex.
> >
> > I can't think of any (serious) method with more straight-forward  
> > strategy
> > than Approval.
> What if we look at Condorcet at the same level of recommending a  
> strategy that works well in most cases. The recommended strategy  
> could be: "list the candidates in the order of preference". That is  
> quite simple and understandable and works in most situations for the  
> benefit of the voter.
> So, is Condorcet strategy more straight forward than Approval  
> strategy? Approval strategy (e.g. "vote one of the frontrunners and  
> candidates that are better") requires the voters to estimate the  
> opinions of other voters while the described Condorcet strategy does  
> not.

I certainly concede that Condorcet more frequently offers a useful strategy
that doesn't require much thought, but to my mind that's not the issue I
was considering. If you wanted to specify the "complete" Condorcet strategy
on the same level that we can describe optimal Approval strategy, I guess
the result would be extremely complex.

Kevin Venzke

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