[Election-Methods] RE : Range V IRV - crux of "unconstitutionality" worry

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Fri Dec 28 00:28:30 PST 2007


--- Warren Smith <wds at math.temple.edu> a écrit :
> Actually, upon trying to crystallize exactly what bothers me about IRV
> constitution-wise, I realized something:
> Suppose you want a voting system (with honest voters)
> to be "unmanipulable by sponsoring rival candidates."
> I.e. you want that it never can help a candidate's winnign
> chances to sponsor a new rival to enter the race.
> But honest-utility-voting passes this test (this is an ultra-honest
> form of range voting where voters vote their honest utilities... 
> not too realistic since no "normalization").
> Plain range voting fails the test (with normalized range votes) 
> but comes "close" to passing it since it is "close" to utility 
> voting.  In fact, it DOES pass it in the time-reversed form 
> that "if X drops out of the race, that will not affect the winner."

I don't think this argument will get Range very far since without the
assumption of sincerity, it only satisfies "voted" IIA and could still be
affected by "sponsoring rival candidates."

I also think you would need to describe the issue in a less absurd-sounding
way. I don't think much of anyone is alarmed about the appeal to parties of
"sponsoring rival candidates" under any method, let alone ALL methods.

And while you'd be discussing this, the lawyers on the other side would be
pointing out that Range can fail to elect the voted first preference of a
majority. This issue would be a significant hurdle, do you agree?

Kevin Venzke

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