[Election-Methods] Fwd: FYI - FairVote MN Responds to Lawsuit Against IRV
davek at clarityconnect.com
Thu Dec 27 12:58:09 PST 2007
On Thu, 27 Dec 2007 09:35:44 +0200 Juho Laatu wrote:
> Dave already explained the use of the equal sign. I was just lazy to
> invent any specific order in my example ballots so I used simple
> ties. Voters are free to list all of them in their order of preference.
And equal unites a pair of candidates, while the pair can be united with
others with more equals.
> Condorcet methods are good methods in such sense that they are not
> very vulnerable to strategic voting and on the other hand they allow
> voters to give quite a lot of information on their preferences (and
> all this info will be taken into account when determining the
> winner). In some other methods ballots carry more information (like
> numerical candidate ratings) but they have more difficulties with
> Condorcet methods are not very widely used today. Partly this may be
> due to the higher complexity of Condorcet methods. They are
> relatively tedious in large scale with manual counting. But computers
> can do the calculations easily. One just needs to collect locally all
> pairwise comparison results (how many voted X>Y etc.) and then send
> this data upwards.
Yes, computers just do tedious without getting excited.
Each election needs just one array:
Arrays from precincts, etc., can be summed into one complete array.
Write-ins can be handled by adjusting the array - PROVIDED - the
counting routines are properly prepared for such a complication.
> Another reason why Condorcet methods are not used in wide scale today
> is that there are quite number of them and it is not quite obvious
> which one to take into use. Actually all of them may be good enough
> when compared to many methods in use today but selecting one can be
> difficult. Experts also have different opinions on which of the
> "Condorcet completion methods" is the ultimate best. All Condorcet
> methods elect the same winner when one of the candidates beats all
> the others (=the Condorcet criterion). But Condorcet methods have the
> interesting property that in some situations A may be preferred to B,
> B to C and C to A. This is where different Condorcet completion
> methods differ from each others.
> Third problem of Condorcet methods is that there are some nasty
> strategies that may be used. It is however quite difficult to apply
> them, especially in typical large public elections where voters make
> independent decisions. And if someone tries to apply strategies they
> easily fail and may rather hurt the strategists. In most practical
> situations the voters can just forget the strategies this and rank
> the candidates sincerely. Condorcet methods are thus relatively
> strategy resistant although some strategic voting scenarios exist (in
> the most commonly iscussed one voters can try to introduce an
> artificial loop in the opinions and thereby fool the system).
> I listed some of the problems of Condorcet methods above, but in
> general Condorcet methods are really good general purpose single
> winner methods for typical political elections.
> There are also Condorcet methods that have been enriched with
> additional information like approval cutoffs, numeric ratings and
> preference strengths. These enhancements are an interesting area of
> study but in most cases the basic (pure ranking based) Condorcet
> methods are good enough and already provide most of the benefits and
> avoid strategic voting related risks (and are simpler).
davek at clarityconnect.com people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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