[Election-Methods] RE : Re: RE : Re: Simple two candidate election

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Mon Dec 24 21:44:03 PST 2007

At 11:35 PM 12/23/2007, rob brown wrote:
>On Dec 23, 2007 8:18 PM, Dave Ketchum 
><<mailto:davek at clarityconnect.com>davek at clarityconnect.com> wrote:
>How did we get here?
>I want best to win, so I certainly want to give all others a lower
>But, if best loses, I want to have done the best I can for soso, my
>second choice.
>Yes, that's what Range seems to promise, but it doesn't deliver.
>A system that allows you to express such a preference, while 
>actually being in your interest to do so, is what is needed.
>Range is not that. At all.

That's correct, as I just explained in another post. Range does not 
allow you to argue full strength for one pairwise election, A>B, then 
argue with the same full strength for B>C.

It is as if someone were to say, "If A is elected, I'll be happy, but 
if B is elected, I'll commit suicide. Oh, and if it turns out that A 
can't be elected, I'll be happy with B, and I'll commit suicide if it 
is C." Quite clearly, a voting system based on the ability to express 
the full range of satisfaction like this cannot maximize overall 
satisfaction, because the votes don't make sense in terms of satisfaction!

However, Mr. Brown seems to have missed that there is a proposal here 
to use pairwise analysis with a Range ballot, so that if there is a 
conflict between the Range winner and the pairwise winner -- which is 
rare, according to theory and the simulations -- there would be an 
actual runoff. It must be an actual runoff, not an "instant runoff" 
or there would be no point, the pairwise winner would simply be the 
winner. What the runoff does is to test voter preference strength.... 
think about it!

The supporters of the Range winner are, by the conditions of the 
problem and if the Range votes were not distorted for some reason, 
more highly motivated to turn out. The supporters of the pairwise 
winner, if they had expressed strong preference strength, would have 
had higher Range numbers as well; so they did not express this, they 
have weaker preference strength, hence less motivation to turn out. 
That's why I say that the Range winner will probably prevail. Unless. 
And the runoff is held to rule out the Unless.

And with one fell swoop, this Range method satisfies the Majority 
Criterion as to the final result.

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