[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Simple two candidate election
davek at clarityconnect.com
Sun Dec 23 18:27:43 PST 2007
On Sun, 23 Dec 2007 23:44:56 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> --- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
>>So we look for a method suitable for two, or more, candidates, such as:
>> Approval - cannot rank 3 candidates as best, worst, and soso
>>(matters when voter wants to indicate best is better than soso AND soso
>>better than worst).
>> Condorcet - allows any number of ranks plus equal ranking such as
>> IRV - like Condorcet, excluding equal ranking and occasionally
>>awarding disappointing choices as to winner.
>> Range - like Condorcet but uses ratings instead of ranks. Ratings
>>give finer control than ranks, but demand that voters learn to assign
Seems to me we are agreed as to goals, but are tripping over what I meant
when I said "effectively". I MEANT to learn how Range works, and then do
the best I could within those rules, such as:
best - max score to try for winning.
worst - min score to try for losing.
soso - this is the hard one - less than max, for I hope for best to
win; probably near max to improve odds for soso if best loses.
I see this as properly using "effectively" as an English word.
> "Assign them effectively"? In Range that means rating everybody either the
> maximum or minimum score. That's not "fine control" surely. It doesn't
> matter how many buttons it has if you're not supposed to push them.
> I would rather say that Range hopes that voters *do not* learn to assign
> the ratings effectively. Or if they learn how, they choose not to.
> Kevin Venzke
davek at clarityconnect.com people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
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