[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Simple two candidate election

[Dave Ketchum]

On Sun, 23 Dec 2007 23:44:56 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Dave,
> 
> --- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
> 
>>So we look for a method suitable for two, or more, candidates, such as:
>>      Approval - cannot rank 3 candidates as best, worst, and soso 
>>(matters when voter wants to indicate best is better than soso AND soso
>>is 
>>better than worst).
>>      Condorcet - allows any number of ranks plus equal ranking such as 
>>Approval offers.
>>      IRV - like Condorcet, excluding equal ranking and occasionally 
>>awarding disappointing choices as to winner.
>>      Range - like Condorcet but uses ratings instead of ranks.  Ratings 
>>give finer control than ranks, but demand that voters learn to assign
>>them effectively.
> 
Seems to me we are agreed as to goals, but are tripping over what I meant 
when I said "effectively".  I MEANT to learn how Range works, and then do 
  the best I could within those rules, such as:
      best - max score to try for winning.
      worst - min score to try for losing.
      soso - this is the hard one - less than max, for I hope for best to 
win; probably near max to improve odds for soso if best loses.

I see this as properly using "effectively" as an English word.
> 
> "Assign them effectively"? In Range that means rating everybody either the
> maximum or minimum score. That's not "fine control" surely. It doesn't
> matter how many buttons it has if you're not supposed to push them.
> 
> I would rather say that Range hopes that voters *do not* learn to assign
> the ratings effectively. Or if they learn how, they choose not to.
> 
> Kevin Venzke
-- 
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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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