[Election-Methods] RE : Re: RE : Re: Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Dec 22 13:55:33 PST 2007


--- Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com> a écrit :
> It's easy to produce a counterexample for a multiple-seat STV  
> election. Here the voter must deal with two different contingencies:  
> my first choice might be eliminated, or my first choice might be  
> elected with a surplus. My sincere second choice might well be  
> different in those two cases; I might prefer A if only one of my top  
> choices is elected, but prefer B and C if two are to be elected (let's  
> say, for example, that B and C have complementary virtues, but that  
> either alone might be less effective than A in representing my views).
> This problem doesn't arise in a single-seat STV (IRV/AV) election, of  
> course.
> At the moment, my guess is that in fact the a difference arises only  
> because of the different opportunities for manipulation presented by  
> the different voting systems, but the question of whether a voter's  
> sincere ranking might be different is intriguing.

I think your multi-winner example is legitimate... You are asked which
candidates (potentially plural) you want representing you, but you are only
able to specify a ranking of single candidates.

I don't think you could substantially change the situation by using a
different multi-winner rule, though. It's more a characteristic of this
pairing of ballot format and purpose.

I'm not sure what a good analogy would be in the single-winner case.

Kevin Venzke

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