[Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?

Markus Schulze markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Fri Dec 21 13:46:40 PST 2007

Dear Ian Fellows,

the Nanson method and the Baldwin method violate
monotonicity and independence of clones. They also
violate the desideratum that candidates, who are not
in the Smith set, should not have any impact on the
result of the elections.

When you try to get a Condorcet method adopted somewhere,
you will not only be attacked by the FPP supporters and
the IRV supporters. You will also be attacked by the
supporters of all kinds of election methods. Therefore,
it will not be sufficient that you argue that the
proposed method is better than FPP and IRV; you will
rather have to argue that the proposed method is the
best of all methods. Therefore, it is useful to propose
a Condorcet method that satisfies a large number of

Furthermore, I don't think that it makes much sense to
try to find a Condorcet method that looks as much as
possible like IRV or as much as possible like Borda.
The best method according to IRV's underlying heuristic
will always be IRV; the best method according to the
underlying heuristic of the Borda method will always
be the Borda method. It makes more sense to propose
a Condorcet method that stands on its own legs.

Markus Schulze

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