[Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Sat Dec 22 13:26:53 PST 2007

On Sat, 22 Dec 2007 19:09:49 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
> Dave Ketchum  > Sent: 22 December 2007 18:01
>>Conceded that some could like IRV, even after understanding what it does.
> It wasn't my intent to make any point for or against IRV, but it interesting another thread is discussing the reasons for the use of
> IRV and the non-use of Condorcet in public elections around the world.
>>HOWEVER, what it does is hidden behind its advertising, and its popularity 
>>should plummet like a rock if a true description was seen by more.
> Maybe.  The "failure" of IRV by excluding the candidate who is "everyone's second choice" is well known, though obviously those
> promoting IRV don't shout this from the rooftops.   I am very sympathetic to the arguments in favour of Condorcet, that it does not
> automatically exclude such "second choice" candidates.  However, there is a major issue about the political acceptability of the
> Condorcet winner by the electors when that "everyone's second choice" candidate was a very weak first choice.  The situation vis a
> vis political acceptability to the electorate would be very different when first choice support is split reasonably equally among
> three front runners.  I have raised this issue of political acceptability before, but I have not yet seen the question answered.  As
> a practical electoral reformer, this is a real issue for me because any reform we promote must be politically acceptable to the
> electorate, never mind the hostile politicians.
Trying with 3 front runners:
      34 A>S  These are committed to A, but see S as best alternative.
      32 B>S  These are normally committed to S, but B has offered 
something immediately attractive.
      32 S  Staying with S.
      1  C  Lemon - will not matter.
      1  ?  Last vote, yet to count.
Condorcet:  S wins for better liking than either A or B.
IRV depends on last vote:
      S - which wins after dropping B.
      B - which loses to A.
      A or C - depends on resolving tie for:
           B - A wins.
           S - S wins.

Agreed "political acceptability" is important, but such as what happens 
above should dent IRV's access to such.
>> The description does not have to say "failure", as I see appropriate 
>>- just to note that while IRV usually awards the same winner as Condorcet, 
>>when it differs it can shock those who appreciate what Condorcet does by 
>>analyzing all that the voter says.
> But this wording again ignores that fact that an IRV ballot and a Condorcet ballot are two very different things.  The Condorcet
> count is not simply making "full" use of the information recorded by the voters on the ballot papers.  A Condorcet ballot is
> completely different from an IRV ballot, because when the voters fill in their Condorcet ballot papers they know that the
> preferences will be used according to the Condorcet counting rules, and so they take that into account.  It is not a question of
> using the SAME information in two different ways (one of which is incomplete and therefore defective), which your original comment
> and the wording above suggest.

Tell me what is so different between these two uses of the same ballot, 
which usually award the same winner for the same voting.
      Agreed that I consider the differences in reading to be serious - 
but that relates  to the rare cases in which I object to IRV 
interpretation - which do not affect how the voter, unable to predict when 
IRV problems may occur, should vote.
> James Gilmour
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.

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