[Election-Methods] Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?

Jonathan Lundell jlundell at pobox.com
Sat Dec 22 10:59:34 PST 2007

On Dec 22, 2007, at 6:45 AM, James Gilmour wrote:

> If you wish to utilise in some way all the information that could be  
> recorded on a preferential ballot, that is a completely
> different voting system from IRV, with different objectives.  The  
> preferences are no longer 'contingency choices', but take on a new
> function depending on the detail of the voting system.  It is almost  
> certain that the voters would mark their ballots in a different
> way in an election by such a voting system from how they would mark  
> their contingency choices in an election by IRV.

This seems plausible enough (and certainly IRV voters should be  
instructed along contingency lines). WRT marking ballots differently,  
setting manipulation aside, and considering only contingency vs  
preferential ranking, do you have an example or two of how and why a  
voter might end up with different ballots in the two contexts?

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