[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Borda-elimination, a Condorcet method for public elections?
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Dec 22 11:55:47 PST 2007
--- Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com> a écrit :
> On Dec 22, 2007, at 6:45 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
> > If you wish to utilise in some way all the information that could be
> > recorded on a preferential ballot, that is a completely
> > different voting system from IRV, with different objectives. The
> > preferences are no longer 'contingency choices', but take on a new
> > function depending on the detail of the voting system. It is almost
> > certain that the voters would mark their ballots in a different
> > way in an election by such a voting system from how they would mark
> > their contingency choices in an election by IRV.
> This seems plausible enough (and certainly IRV voters should be
> instructed along contingency lines). WRT marking ballots differently,
> setting manipulation aside, and considering only contingency vs
> preferential ranking, do you have an example or two of how and why a
> voter might end up with different ballots in the two contexts?
I imagine James Gilmour is hinting at the fact that specifying lower
preferences under Condorcet methods can damage higher-ranked candidates. So
the Condorcet voter has to think about how far down to rank while the IRV
voter should not have to.
Not just voter incentives but candidate incentives will vary by method,
too. Clearly certain types of candidates will not be viable under IRV but
could be under Condorcet. It would probably be more safe to give a high
ranking to this sort of candidate under Condorcet than under IRV.
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