[Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?

Juho juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Tue Dec 11 14:01:23 PST 2007

On Dec 10, 2007, at 16:40 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 01:12 AM 12/5/2007, Juho wrote:
>> On Dec 5, 2007, at 5:24 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>> If someone can buy a candidate's withdrawal, they could presumably
>>> also buy the candidate if the candidate wins, and the latter is
>>> actually more dangerous!
>> Buying the withdrawal of a losing candidate is probably cheaper.
> Cheaper and less effective. Essentially, one is buying fewer votes.  
> Now, how is the winner going to know that he should be grateful to  
> Mr. Bigpockets for the bribe? Tell him, it might backfire. (Either  
> the winner is ethical and reports the attempt to align him with Mr.  
> Bigpocket's desires, or he is not and, of course, wants more money,  
> and what was paid to the loser isn't of any benefit to him.... he  
> *might* think it was, and *might* go along, but it's risky for  
> Bigpockets. Buy the winner and you have control over the process of  
> legislation. Buy a loser, you merely gain a shaky opportunity.

The deal could be e.g. such that there are three looped candidates  
A>B>C>A. A has the smallest defeat and is about to win before the  
"withdrawal rounds". Candidate B can now withdraw and make C the  
winner. C offers B some nice position to B for a withdrawal (C will  
be the winner so he can arrange this).

B may also actually prefer C to A and will withdraw from that reason  
since based on the results B>C>A was probably a common opinion among  
the C supporters, and maybe B's personal opinion too.

B might claim that the reason for his withdrawal is the high number  
of strategic votes that made A unjustly the winner. We have no way of  
knowing if that is the truth.


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