[Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Mon Dec 10 06:40:25 PST 2007

At 01:12 AM 12/5/2007, Juho wrote:
>On Dec 5, 2007, at 5:24 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>If someone can buy a candidate's withdrawal, they could presumably
>>also buy the candidate if the candidate wins, and the latter is
>>actually more dangerous!
>Buying the withdrawal of a losing candidate is probably cheaper.

Cheaper and less effective. Essentially, one is buying fewer votes. 
Now, how is the winner going to know that he should be grateful to 
Mr. Bigpockets for the bribe? Tell him, it might backfire. (Either 
the winner is ethical and reports the attempt to align him with Mr. 
Bigpocket's desires, or he is not and, of course, wants more money, 
and what was paid to the loser isn't of any benefit to him.... he 
*might* think it was, and *might* go along, but it's risky for 
Bigpockets. Buy the winner and you have control over the process of 
legislation. Buy a loser, you merely gain a shaky opportunity.

>>Consider an asset system where the electors maintain the right of
>>recall -- essentially vote reassignment.
>This kind of systems would keep the voters in touch and in charge of
>what is happening in politics.

Probably not, at least not the average voter. But it creates a class 
of voters who *are* likely to be more interested, because their 
interest can result in changes. Immediate changes, if there are enough of them.

>  The inability of voters to change
>their opinion in midterm can also be intentional.

It is.

>  This kind of an
>arrangement guarantees the representatives a more steady basis for
>work and makes it possible to make decisions that are not very
>popular among the voters (e.g. taxes) (but that might be better
>understood among them by the next election).

Yes, this is the classic argument. It's a fundamentally 
antidemocratic argument, I'll note. The same principle is used to 
argue against *any* democracy, except among an elite.

The argument is actually sound, in a way, given the existing 
structure. Implement direct democracy, you'll see serious problems. 
But Asset Voting is not direct democracy, and the 
Direct/Representative hybrid I've proposed doesn't interfere with the 
ability of representatives to *work.* The "work" is deliberative 
process, and there is no need to bounce elected representatives from 
that process immediately, even if they lost all their votes. Only if 
they were seriously disruptive would it become necessary to relieve 
them of their seat quickly. And any assembly can do that anyway under 
current conditions.

The basic concept that has been introduced here is a separation 
between deliberative process (which requires a smaller participating 
group) and voting (which need not be so restricted). Routinely, I 
expect that nearly all votes would be cast by those with seats and 
only a few by electors outside the assembly. However, if the assembly 
seriously departs from representing the voters (through the freely 
chosen electors), there is then a safety valve, a penumbra of 
electors starts to become more active, reweighting the assembly 
toward representing the people. Gradually, the seats are recomposed, 
but not quickly, unless there are immediate recall actions. I'd 
discourage that, absent true emergency, and I can't imagine one that 
would require it.

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