[Election-Methods] RE : Re: Is the Condorcet winner always the best?
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Dec 11 06:05:23 PST 2007
--- Jonathan Lundell <jlundell at pobox.com> a écrit :
> ...should choose B as a good compromise, with the A voters saying A is
> good, B OK, C very bad. But Diego's profile suggests to me that the A
> voters are saying something like A is good, B is bad, C is very bad.
> Not that they can express it in a normal linear ballot, just that
> we're being told a little more about their opinions.
In my opinion, to the extent that the effect of a ">>bad>verybad" vote is
disregarded, the point of letting voters indicate such preferences is
> In my example, the effect of a later-no-harm voting rule is evident.
> In Diego's, a rule (such as STV) that elects A doesn't seem
> unreasonable to me.
> The problem is that with an ordinary linear ballot (no '>>'), we can't
> distinguish between the cases. Not that I'm arguing that we should
> employ '>>'; offhand, that strikes me as a complication to be avoided.
In one sense I don't agree. If >> is allowed then apparently it's safe to
vote ">>bad>verybad." If >> isn't allowed then voters will probably be more
cautious, since the method could very well take them as serious if they say
that bad is better than verybad.
I tend to think that if B doesn't win in Diego's scenario, the method is
second-guessing the voters. It either disbelieves the C voters' preference
for B over A, or finds that there's something more important than majority
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