[Election-Methods] Mixing Condorcet and Approval...

Stéphane Rouillon stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Mon Dec 17 18:11:40 PST 2007

For correcting a detail: C>A 51-49, because I suppose unranked candidate 
are considered
least in your example ( 49: A | > C is equivalent to 49: A | > C > B)
A is removed with a support of 49.
Then B is removed gathering  48 as support.
And the latest candidate removed ic C with only 3 votes.

For Kevin's understanding, each ballot imply a unique support that goes 
to the last
removed candidate among the acceptable (above truncation | ) candidates.

If an elector puts its | after its first choice, it means that first 
preference will get the support,
whatever the Condorcet order. If the elector puts the | later in the 
preference order,
it means some consensus could be gathered to obtain a higher support for 
some common candidate.

For electing a single individual, this method seems uneffective. Its 
goal is to build high support candidates
for antagonists philosophies while permitting as much candidates for the 
same philosophy without
arming the selction (no crowding or cloning effects). Later supports are 
used not to elect candidates
with most support, but to build a list for each party. Elected 
representatives are finally selected using a proportional method.

So Chris comment about criteria for a single winner method maybe good, 
but I do not believe they apply to a multiple winner method because 
highest support does not necessary produce an elected member as small 
support does not necessarily producer a loser.  Each score are to be 
compared to other scores of candidates from the same party in another 
district. It all comes from considering an election as a representation 
exercise instead of a battle.

S. Rouillon

Chris Benham a écrit :
> Stephane,
> I think I now get it, but to say that an  "eliminated" candidate wins 
> is very strange because in the election
> method context "eliminate" normally means "disqualify from winning, 
> drop from the ballots and henceforth ignore".
> >From your original description it seemed that the approvals served 
> only to give all the candidates each a final "approbation"
> score (just for decoration).
> As I now understand it, this method just looks like a very complicated 
> way of nearly always electing the Approval winner.
> 49: A | > C
> 48: B | > C
> 03: C | > B
> C>B 52-48,  C>A 52-48,  B>A 51-49.  RP(wv) order C>B>A. 
> By my calculation your method elects the Approval winner A, violating 
> Majority Loser, Majority for Solid Coalitions and
> the Condorcet criterion.
> Is that right?
> Chris Benham
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