[Election-Methods] Mixing Condorcet and Approval...
stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Mon Dec 17 18:11:40 PST 2007
For correcting a detail: C>A 51-49, because I suppose unranked candidate
least in your example ( 49: A | > C is equivalent to 49: A | > C > B)
A is removed with a support of 49.
Then B is removed gathering 48 as support.
And the latest candidate removed ic C with only 3 votes.
For Kevin's understanding, each ballot imply a unique support that goes
to the last
removed candidate among the acceptable (above truncation | ) candidates.
If an elector puts its | after its first choice, it means that first
preference will get the support,
whatever the Condorcet order. If the elector puts the | later in the
it means some consensus could be gathered to obtain a higher support for
some common candidate.
For electing a single individual, this method seems uneffective. Its
goal is to build high support candidates
for antagonists philosophies while permitting as much candidates for the
same philosophy without
arming the selction (no crowding or cloning effects). Later supports are
used not to elect candidates
with most support, but to build a list for each party. Elected
representatives are finally selected using a proportional method.
So Chris comment about criteria for a single winner method maybe good,
but I do not believe they apply to a multiple winner method because
highest support does not necessary produce an elected member as small
support does not necessarily producer a loser. Each score are to be
compared to other scores of candidates from the same party in another
district. It all comes from considering an election as a representation
exercise instead of a battle.
Chris Benham a écrit :
> I think I now get it, but to say that an "eliminated" candidate wins
> is very strange because in the election
> method context "eliminate" normally means "disqualify from winning,
> drop from the ballots and henceforth ignore".
> >From your original description it seemed that the approvals served
> only to give all the candidates each a final "approbation"
> score (just for decoration).
> As I now understand it, this method just looks like a very complicated
> way of nearly always electing the Approval winner.
> 49: A | > C
> 48: B | > C
> 03: C | > B
> C>B 52-48, C>A 52-48, B>A 51-49. RP(wv) order C>B>A.
> By my calculation your method elects the Approval winner A, violating
> Majority Loser, Majority for Solid Coalitions and
> the Condorcet criterion.
> Is that right?
> Chris Benham
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