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For correcting a detail: C>A 51-49, because I suppose unranked
candidate are considered<br>
least in your example (
49: A | > C is equivalent to 49: A | > C > B)<br>
A is removed with a support of 49. <br>
Then B is removed gathering 48 as support.<br>
And the latest candidate removed ic C with only 3 votes.<br>
<br>
For Kevin's understanding, each ballot imply a unique support that goes
to the last<br>
removed candidate among the acceptable (above truncation | ) candidates.<br>
<br>
If an elector puts its | after its first choice, it means that first
preference will get the support,<br>
whatever the Condorcet order. If the elector puts the | later in the
preference order,<br>
it means some consensus could be gathered to obtain a higher support
for some common candidate.<br>
<br>
For electing a single individual, this method seems uneffective. Its
goal is to build high support candidates<br>
for antagonists philosophies while permitting as much candidates for
the same philosophy without<br>
arming the selction (no crowding or cloning effects). Later supports
are used not to elect candidates<br>
with most support, but to build a list for each party. Elected
representatives are finally selected using a proportional method.<br>
<br>
So Chris comment about criteria for a single winner method maybe good,
but I do not believe they apply to a multiple winner method because
highest support does not necessary produce an elected member as small
support does not necessarily producer a loser. Each score are to be
compared to other scores of candidates from the same party in another
district. It all comes from considering an election as a representation
exercise instead of a battle.<br>
<br>
S. Rouillon<br>
<br>
Chris Benham a écrit :
<blockquote cite="mid46D25633.10206@optusnet.com.au" type="cite">
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Stephane,<br>
<br>
I think I now get it, but to say that an "eliminated" candidate wins
is very strange because in the election<br>
method context "eliminate" normally means "disqualify from winning,
drop from the ballots and henceforth ignore".<br>
>From your original description it seemed that the approvals served
only
to give all the candidates each a final "approbation"<br>
score (just for decoration).<br>
<br>
As I now understand it, this method just looks like a very complicated
way of nearly always electing the Approval winner.<br>
<br>
49: A | > C<br>
48: B | > C<br>
03: C | > B<br>
<br>
C>B 52-48, C>A 52-48, B>A 51-49. RP(wv) order C>B>A.
<br>
<br>
By my calculation your method elects the Approval winner A, violating
Majority Loser, Majority for Solid Coalitions and<br>
the Condorcet criterion.<br>
<br>
Is that right?<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
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