[Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise (correction)

[Juho]

There are deterministic method related tracks that have not been  
discussed so far. It is possible to use the uncertainty involved in  
the polls. The votes need not be exactly 55% and 45% but there can be  
some uncertainty on which one of the two groups is bigger.

The A supporters may vote "A>C>>B" instead of "A>>C>B" to increase  
the probability of electing C in the case that the A group will not  
have majority. (The method could use e.g. approval cutoff, different  
preference strengths, ratings.)

I think this works also with the "near perfect information"  
assumption. Probabilities depend on the level of "nearness".

Juho


P.S. I assume the challenge is now to elect only "good" compromise  
candidates



On Aug 30, 2007, at 16:37 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:

>
>
> Forest W Simmons wrote:
>> Below where I said "unlike Borda" I should have said "unlike D2MAC."
>> Neither the Borda solution nor the reverse plurality solution  
>> requires
>> anything other than the ordinal preferences.
>>
>> So the deterministic solutions that do not depend on some form of  
>> vote
>> trading are insensitive to whether or not the voters are inclined to
>> approve C.
>>
>> Perhaps we could refine the challenge to ask for methods that elect C
>> with near certainty when the two factions are
>>
>> 55 A 100 C 80 B 0
>> 45 B 100 C 80 B 0
>>
>> but almost surely do not elect C with when the two factions are
>>
>> 55 A 100 C 20 B 0
>> 45 B 100 C 20 B 0
>>
>> assuming throughout optimal strategical voting under near perfect
>> information.
>>
>> It seems to me that vote trading and/or randomness are needed to  
>> solve
>> this challenge.
>>
>
> I am inclined to agree with you. however, I am not willing to give up
> hope on a third type of method yet.
>
> I would say that on a lower level you need"
>   "A method that makes it optimal for an individual voter to vote with
> true preference."
>
> the 3 methods I have noticed identified so far are vote trading,
> randomized ballots, and hiding information from the voter.
>
> your assumption of "near perfect information" obviously eliminates the
> last one. Both of the methods that are left reduce to giving the  
> voters
> good reason to vote the truth. I think it is a good idea to keep  
> that in
> mind when devising future systems.
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for  
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