[Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 07:25 PM 8/29/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>In my opinion democracy in its basic meaning is not just a tool to
>reproduce the result of a violent process without the violent process.

This is presuming a "meaning" to democracy disconnected from history 
and the forces creating it and making it attractive. I don't mind 
that, particularly, but am naturally skeptical about it.

Obviously, democracy can do more than "reproduce the result of a 
violent process," but, look around. "Democracy," when it ignores the 
power realities, and particularly when it fails to address the 
concerns *of the majority*, can easily fall back to violence. There 
is a hierarchy: consensus is more powerful than supermajority, 
supermajority is more powerful than majority, majority is more 
powerful than plurality, and plurality is more powerful than 
isolation and purely independent action.

The point was that plurality meant something. Refusing to look at 
that because of a distaste for violence is, well, refusing to look at 
the sources of things because we imagine that they "should" be some 
other way. We cannot make things better if we are not willing to 
start where we are. And to start where we are, we must understand 
where we are, and possibly how we got here.

I am most concerned about majority *consent.* Jobst is ignoring the 
fact that I'm suggesting majority *consent* for decisions; what do 
you call it when a minority imposes its will on a majority?

If the majority explicitly consents to the *process*, it's fine. That 
is, the majority could decide that this election will be decided by 
tossing a coin. Question: what level of majority should be required 
to allow this to be the rule?

More to the point, the majority could consent to using, say, Range, 
Bucklin, IRV, whatever, that it will accept the result. Question: if 
the majority explicitly consents to this for a specific election, 
does the election method satisfy the Majority Criterion?

(I'll answer this one: it does not; however it *does* satisfy the 
underlying principle, which is majority rule.)

Note that the fact we have passed a law regarding elections does not 
satisfy what I'm laying out as a standard for judging democratic 
decisions. That is a majority *at one time* making a decision for a 
*different* electorate at a *different* time. However, a question on 
the same ballot determining how the winner of the election will be 
determined, if it receives majority consent, *would* satisfy that.

> > I'm not sure at all what a "just share of power" is.
>
>Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power.
>By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually
>begin.

What I pointed out here was that the ratings given did not contain 
sufficient information to determine justice. Again, without defining 
justice, but relying upon common understanding of it, we can easily 
construct scenarios that fully explain the ratings as sincere, but 
which have quite different implications regarding justice. In the 
challenge election, to repeat, we have

55: A 100, B 0,   C 80
45: A 0,   B 100, C 80

It was assumed that the ratings were "sincere," though that was not defined.

Now, it's obvious that C is what we would ordinarily understand as 
the best winner. But a majority will disagree, and thus the 
challenge. I don't recall the exact wording, but is there a method 
which, if adopted, would cause C to win, even if the A and B voters 
are selfish, and we might assume, the A voters know that they are in 
the majority?

The answer given was Borda with equal ranking prohibited. Now, when I 
first read this, I did not properly understand it. I should repeat 
what I did before, only correctly.

Let me be explicit about how this could elect C. I will modify the 
way Borda count from how it is usually stated to make it equivalent 
to a Range 2 election (CR 3).

Sincere votes.

55: A>C>B
45: B>C>A

Counts: A, B, C

55: 2 0 1
45: 0 2 1

totals:

A 110, B 90, C 100. This does not elect C. However the B voters, if 
they understand the situation, can vote

45: C>B>A

or counts A, B, C:
45: 0 1 2

totals:
A 110, B 45, C 145. C wins, so it appears a quite desirable strategy 
for the B voters, as we would understand the sincere ratings.

Is there a counter-strategy? What if the A voters reverse their 
second and third preferences?

55: 2 1 0

With the strategic votes from the other side the totals are

A 110, B 100, C 90; they defeat the compromise attempted by the B 
voters. However, the gain is relatively small, it would seem (but 
there is an assumption that a gain of 20 in rating is "small." Not 
necessarily.)

and with the original sincere Borda votes from the B voters, this 
counterstrategy would give us

totals
A 110, B 135, C 90.

So, somewhat off the topic, but interesting nevertheless, the B 
voters, being not only selfish, but clever, mount a secret campaign 
to get all the B voters to vote the strategy. However, they also 
arrange to leak this information to the A voters, and, 
*supersecretly*, they are not going to do that, they are going to 
vote sincerely. If the A voters fall for it and vote strategically, 
to defeat the nefarious stratagem of the B voters, and the B voters 
then simply vote sincerely, B prevails, which is a disaster for the A 
voters and a total victory for the B voters.

The A voters are *probably* better off simply voting sincerely. And 
that was Jobst's point. It's not what he said, though, that the A 
voters had no motive to reverse preference. Rather, doing so would be 
tricky, and it would depend on reliable knowledge, difficult to come 
by in a world of sneaky and selfish voters.

Now, if you knew that you would be an A voter in this scenario, why 
would you accept Borda as a method? Indeed, this is exactly what will 
be argued against it, as it is argued against Range -- though quite 
defectively there -- that it may "fail" to elect the first preference 
of a majority. In Range, though, the majority can always, simply by 
insisting upon it as a strong preference, prevail.

Frankly, to me, if we assume that the votes represent commensurable 
utilities, then a rational solution for the B voters, with 
practically any election method in place, is to negotiate, to offer 
compensation of some kind, to induce the A voters to voluntarily give 
up their first preference. It would generally be to the advantage of 
a minority that wants the majority to give up some small value, in 
order to gain great value for themselves, to offer compensation, so 
that the A voters become, at least, neutral or shift preference in 
the other direction.

If the S.U. maximizer is chosen through such a process, and the 
negotiation was fair and intelligent, the compensation so determined 
would maximize the overall value of the election *and* distribute 
that value over all voters who participate in it.

Problems with choosing the S.U. maximizer arise when the distribution 
of benefit is not even.

Then, of course, there is the normalization problem. Explicitly, 
Jobst stated that the ratings given were not utilities, and that he 
doesn't believe in utilities as having any meaning.

However, we can easily imagine, and did imagine, an election where 
the ratings were explained. The election was choosing three possible 
sites for a public facility, and the two factions consisted of people 
with travel distances or times arranged such that the ratings 
represented the relative value of each site to them. But the same 
ratings are explained by a whole universe of values; in particular, 
what I explored was the situation that the total difference between 
the A/B pair for the A voters was 100 km, and that for the B voters, 
10 km. From this, it was apparent that the "just" result would not be 
C, it would be A. Of course, we could also easily arrange the 
distances such that the just winner was B, or, differently, C.

S.U. maximization, to be accurate, depends on absolute utilities. But 
we should not jump to the hasty conclusion that Range voting is 
useless, because of the difficulty of arranging for absolute 
utilities to be voted. No, there is a reasonable assumption that the 
satisfaction range of voters, in general, averages out to be 
commensurable. That assumption is obviously not always going to hold, 
and the travel distance example shows that. But if we are thinking 
about votes, and the principle of giving all voters the same power, 
Range is giving them all the same range of preference.

Nevertheless, this *is* an inaccurate assumption, which is why Range 
is not ideal in the simulations unless one arranges for the voters to 
vote absolute utilities. And thus I find it interesting to *test* the 
Range winner, when there is a preference winner different from the 
Range winner. I consider this worthy of exploration; it appears to me 
that, for starters, it would encourage more sincere voting, i.e., 
voting a more accurate expression of relative utilities, because 
preference would still count. Approval style voting would become a 
little less attractive. And then, an actual runoff tests preference 
strengths. If it is true that the majority has a weak preference 
compared to the minority's strong one, then the majority will have 
reduced incentive to turn out. In the present example, they get quite 
a good outcome in a runoff between A and C, guaranteed, with no 
effort, they already won that much. Is it worth the trouble of going 
to the polls to get a small increase in value? It was argued that 
they were "selfish," but it is not selfish to spend more than 
necessary to get a good outcome, it is foolish. It would depend on 
the *true* preference strength.

On the other hand, the B voters would have high incentive to turn 
out, to defend the Range winner against a very bad choice from their 
point of view. These preferential turnout considerations would almost 
certainly shift the results toward the Range winner.

But there is more. It is not altruism to recognize value in 
distributing benefit, there is self-interest there. If society 
functions with members being more generally satisfied, everyone 
benefits, goods and services are cheaper or better, and life is just 
all around more pleasant. Insurrection would be rare, thus making far 
more unlikely the massive and general destruction that it can bring.

*Some* of the A voters, coming to understand the position of the B 
voters, and realizing that they can provide a large benefit to the B 
voters at small cost to themselves (the total benefit is greater than 
their loss), might shift their preference to take into consideration 
the new information that they gained in the poll. B voters have no 
such reason to change their preference, for by attempting to please 
the A voters, they would be incurring a huge cost in order to provide 
a small benefit. Not sane.

*And* there could be negotiation. This negotiation does not require 
trusting the other faction, but it does require the inviolability of 
contracts, or, alternatively, some kind of escrow. The B voters 
attempt to determine the real value of those 20 rating points to the 
A voters, they do this through polling or actual negotiation. (FA/DP 
would be excellent for this, indeed, FA/DP was designed to do this 
kind of thing). Once they have determined that, provided that it is 
small enough, they collect from their own funds to be placed in 
escrow, to be distributed to *everyone* if C wins. Distributing it to 
everone avoids any consideration of trying to penetrate the secrecy 
of votes. However, it's also possible to distribute it only to those 
who register for it in advance of the election.

Now, there remain problems, mostly having to do with internal process 
within the B faction. What about the tragedy of the commons *within* 
that faction? I'm not trying to solve that problem today, I'm just 
noting that the B faction, if it acts coherently, could easily shift 
the election in their favor, and end up with a substantial "profit," 
i.e, they would gain more value than they lose.

Getting the B faction to act coherently is a quite different problem. 
It's possible, for example, that they would have the power to tax 
themselves, to raise the funds, we have made no specifications of how 
they might be organized.



> > What is the
> > standard? If we have electoral democracy, or direct democracy,
> > everyone has the same power, one vote.
>
>Nope. Depends on situation. In my example, 49% have no power at all.
>That everyone has 1 vote does not mean everyone has the same power. It
>is only a formal equality.
>
> > This entity that supposedly
> > has oppressive power is not a person, nor is it, generally, a
> > faction. The "majority" is merely a grouping in any decision, the
> > grouping that outnumbers the other.
>
>Does that matter? It is a group that can rule without regard of the
>others. Often this group is known in advance and is pretty stable over
>time.
>
> > And in pure democratic process, there are only two groups, and no
> > decision is made unless one outnumbers the others. I.e., if the Yes
> > faction outnumbers, the No faction, the motion prevails; otherwise,
> > it fails.
>
>What you call a "pure democratic process" is just what I claim is not
>democratic at all, for the given reasons.
>
> > Giving the "minority" a "share of power" means making decisions
> > contrary to the consent of the majority.
>
>Of course, that's what it is all about: The majority will not get its
>will all the time, only more often than the minority.
>
> > But "sharing power" is not a
> > goal of democracy; rather, the common welfare is.
>
>Who says so? And what is "common welfare" by the way? If I remember
>correctly, you were not very delighted when I proposed to use welfare
>economical measures in voting theory...
>
> > The goal is to make
> > wise decisions; a rough standard of wisdom is consensus; but it is
> > considered, sometimes, necessary to make decisions without consensus,
> > so a *minimum* standard is set, and the minimum is obvious: a
> > majority.
>
>Please look at the example again. The only thing that's obvious about is
>is that the majority is not a good approximation of consensus, whereas
>the compromise option C is a perfect consensus!
>
> > Below that point, the thinking would go, it is more likely
> > that the proposed action is unwise than that it is wise.
>
>This reminds me of Ramon Llulls reasoning that there will always be a
>beats-all-winner: He claimed that always at least half of the
>electorate will judge correctly what the god-wanted option is.
>
> > Democracy uses, aggregates, the *judgement* of the people. It is not
> > a grant of power; the people have their power, and it is not
> > something given to them by government;
>
>By government? How does that come into play here?
>
> > Jobst has not thought these matters through, it appears.
>
>Your appearance fails here.
>
> > > > If C wins, the B supporters gain 60% utility, that's large. If
> > > > they pay the A voters the equivalent of the A loss, 20%, they are
> > > > still way ahead.
> > >
> > >You still assume that their is a "loss" to the A voters.
> >
> > Comparatively, yes. And I gave an example showing that.
> >
> > >  But that is just wrong: the A voters have no right to the election
> > > of A, it is not their property which they can "loose".
> >
> > Lose.
>
>I'm so sorry for my bad English and would prefer a discussion in German.
>However, I think you know what I meant.
>
> > Let me put it this way: you assert this, but you have done nothing
> > that establishes that the majority does *not* have the right to its
> > preference.
>
>The old ontological problem: One claims something exists, the other
>claims it does not. Who must prove it?
>
> > Every legislative body in actual existence, with actual sovereignty,
> > gives the majority this power. On what basis do you assert that this
> > is not a right?
>
>What we are discussing here is (at least I thought so) the theory of
>election methods or, more generally, group decision methods. This is a
>normative discussion, i.e., we try to find out how things should be.
>For a normative discussion, it is usually quite irrelevant how things
>are now or have once been, only how they could be. Rights in this
>context are usually not based on actual behaviour but on a
>well-grounded theory which you could call philosophical. In my
>philosophy, everyone should have a right to influence decisions
>regardless whether she belongs to a majority or not.
>
> > I agree that it is not an absolute right. "Rights" are conventions
> > established to guide society; I have no "right" not to be eaten by a
> > lion. I have only the power to prevent it, if I do. We grant the
> > majority the right of decision because the alternative is *worse*.
>
>What is "the" alternative you refer to? And why do you think it is
>worse?
>
> > Most societies establish boundaries over the power of the majority,
> > preventing it from oppressing minorities without justice.
>
>But only insofar as certain basic rights of the minority shall not be
>violated.
>
> > However,
> > the majority can always circumvent these boundaries *if it cares to*.
>
>If that is so in your society, I'm glad I don't live there... In mine a
>mere majority cannot, say, change the constitution or violate it and
>prevent the supreme court from intervening...
>
> > > > It is a very good deal for the B voters
> > >
> > >No, they would have to pay for a solution which I think they have a
> > > right to!
> >
> > What is the basis for this *right*?
>
>The basis is the basic right of equality. Since all people shall be
>equal, I infer that they should be equally able to influence a
>decision. As a decision has only one outcome, this goal can seeminly
>only be met by giving each voter the power to assign an equal share of
>winning probability to an option of her choice. Therefore Random Ballot
>is my "democratic benchmark" with which I compare possible outcomes.
>
> > Jobst asserts that the A voters do not "lose" anything by getting C,
> > because they, allegedly, have no right to A. But whether or not they
> > lose anything has nothing to do with rights. If they get A, they have
> > a certain value. If they get C, they have less value. That is the
> > meaning of "lose." It is a relative term.
>
>Yes, and if they get B, they have still another value. The point is what
>situation you start with before your "loss" applies. And I think we
>should start with the "democratic benchmark" instead of a "majoritarian
>benchmark".
>
> > The ratings given by Jobst, we were allowed to assume, are "sincere
> > utilities." And part of the condition was that they are
> > commensurable.
>
>Who said so?
>
>(Again stopping to read further for lack if time -- sorry.)
>
>Jobst
>
> > However, the neutral value was not given. Suppose that
> > the neutral position, for the A voters, is the choice of A. If A is
> > chosen, they lose nothing, they gain nothing. If C is chosen, they
> > lose a certain value, and if B is chosen, they lose five times that
> > amount. This is consistent with "sincere utilities," which Jobst says
> > he does not believe in, though clearly it can have meaning, and,
> > under some conditions, it could even be measured.
> >
> > Whereas the B voters, I could assert, again consistently with their
> > ratings, might have a neutral position also with A. If A is chosen,
> > they neither gain nor lose value. If C is chosen, they gain a certain
> > value; if B is chosen, they gain 5/4 that value.
> >
> > These statements of gain and loss are entirely consistent with the
> > ratings given, they make them rational and sincere.
> >
> > Now, if we assume that the range of values is the same for all
> > voters, and that one of A, B, or C must be chosen, how can you assert
> > that the A voters don't lose anything by the choice of C?
> >
> > Jobst, it's preposterous. You are out on a limb. The sooner you can
> > see it, the less embarrassing it will be....
> >
> > Now, as describe, A is the choice that leaves everyone in neutral
> > position. Clearly, A is a *just* choice, it harms nobody. (Given the
> > conditions as I've further specified them.)
> >
> > However, the B voters could get a much better outcome. But it would
> > cost the A voters something. What in the world is wrong with them
> > offering to compensate the A voters for their loss?
> >
> > If they offer the A voters more than the A voters will lose by the
> > adoption of C, then it is win-win. Obviously, there would be no
> > motive for them to offer more than the election of C is worth to
> > them.... but they could offer anything below that and be ahead.
> >
> > Consideration of the common welfare would indicate that some transfer
> > would be appropriate, to more evenly distribute the benefit of the
> > gain possible through S.U. maximization, as would happen with sincere
> > Range Votes in a case like this. There is *overall* gain, but it is
> > not evenly distributed.
> >
> > What if the majority is poor and the minority is rich? Would you
> > still think it "just" to take this value from the poor and give it to
> > the rich?
> >
> > > > Jobst regards it as unjust that the majority should be paid by
> > > > the minority to get an outcome he regards as more just. However,
> > > > he isn't looking at the utilities
> > >
> > >No. Why must I repeat over and over again that I don't believe in
> > >measurable utility. I interpret the numbers I gave in the example in
> > >the way I describes several times: as representing preferences over
> > > lotteries!
> >
> > This is a common error. An assumption that utilities are not
> > measurable ignores that we may, in studying a situation, *posit*
> > utilities. The utilities then provide an explanation for preferences
> > and an understanding of preference strengths. To really study
> > situations like this, one needs to look at absolute and commensurable
> > utilities, which, again, can be posited. Jobst started with
> > *relative* utilities, normalized, which are of limited use in
> > studying the justice of a situation. Quite simply, as I believe I
> > showed, the justice could radically change depending on the
> > underlying absolute utilities, which can have greatly different
> > meaning than the normalized, relative ones.
> >
> > (when we assumed, here, that the utilities were commensurable, we
> > made no assumption about the neutral position. What we assumed was
> > that summing the utilities would produce meaningful anticipation of
> > the overall value to society. It is *as if* there were cash values
> > associated with the utilities, though that does introduce the
> > possible problem that the same amount of cash may have differing
> > value to different people.
> >
> > When transfers are considered, though, the transfers, if voluntarily
> > accepted, act to equalize value, the transfers make the utilities
> > commensurable. There would be a better way to say this, ... but it's
> > late.
> >
> > > > The actual
> > > > consequences of the election are irrelevant to him.
> > >
> > >What do you think you do here? Where did I say such a thing? The
> > >actual consequences should of course be that the obvious compromise
> > >solution C should be elected without anyone having to "pay" for it!
> >
> > Where does this "should" come from? Is it based on public benefit?
> > What's the basis?
> >
> > Jobst considers C "obvious" because he is making certain unstated
> > assumptions. I'm not making those assumptions.
> >
> > One thing is clear. It would seem equitable to me that the costs and
> > benefits of public cooperation should be equally distributed, to the
> > extent possible. If this is true, then the transfers I suggested
> > would be just. How to determine them is another matter. The most
> > obvious way is by free offer and acceptance. Ideally, with such, we
> > could get a situation where all voters would rationally settle on a
> > single outcome. Consensus.
> >
> > Yet Jobst, apparently, would consider this unjust. Why should anyone
> > have to "pay" for the "obvious compromise"?
> >
> > Well, why should one faction get a large benefit and another one a
> > smaller benefit, if we assume that all the utilities are positive?
> > Why should one faction get a loss while another gets a gain? -- under
> > other assumptions about the absolute utilities consistent with the
> > ratings.
> >
> > *If* we could somehow guarantee that utilities are sincere, we could
> > maximize overall benefit, meaning that, if it were distributed
> > equally, *all* would benefit the most from the maximizing choice.
> >
> > Commonly, it's asserted that Range Voting is great with sincere
> > voters, but, of course, voters won't be sincere, so forgeddaboudit.
> > It's an error for two reasons: one is that Range works quite well
> > with strategic voters, and sincere voters, as long as they vote
> > *intelligently* -- which is also sincere, but not in a naive way --
> > do just as well or better, no matter how everyone else votes. The
> > other is that something like a Clarke tax could act to simultaneously
> > encourage sincere voting and the distribution of benefit.
> >
> > Here, I suggested a way to do it without changes in law. All it would
> > take is sufficient organization of the people, for both the majority
> > and minority would need to be organized to be able to effectively
> > negotiate the consensus.
> >
> > That, of course, is quite a trick, but I think it can be done.
> > Indeed, I think it *will* be done. It is far too obvious, inertia
> > means that movement is slow, but inexorable.
> >
> > > > But this is a democracy.
> > >
> > >What is the "this" you are referring to?
> >
> > Well, presumably, what we are discussing.
> >
> > > > Sure, one can imagine systems where majority
> > > > rule is not sufficient for making decisions,
> > >
> > >I cannot imagine a system where majority rule *is* sufficient for
> > >making really *democratic* decisions.
> >
> > Again, the resolution of the apparent disagreement comes if we
> > understand "democracy" as a goal or standard, rather than something
> > completely realizable, and that it applies to each decision made by a
> > society. There are *degrees* of democracy, and there is a *minimum*
> > standard for democracy. We have *total* democracy when we have full
> > consensus. And we have minimal democracy when a majority consents to
> > a decision. Below that level it is not democracy at all, it is
> > oligarchy and coercion.
> >
> > > > Contrary to what Jobst might assume, I have a lot of experience
> > > > with consensus communities, both positive and negative.
> > >
> > >I don't assume anything about your experience and have never said
> > >so. But please keep in mind that consensus is a much different thing
> > >from majority rule.
> >
> > Duh!
> >
> > >  I should think my example makes this very clear: No consensus
> > > about A nor about B, only consensus about B being nearly as good!
> >
> > Sure. But context matters. Actually, the example was that C was
> > nearly as good.
> >
> > > > However, when you get down to the nuts and bolts of a system,
> > > > *including how the system is implemented,* majority rule has
> > > > proven itself to be practical *and* sustainable.
> > >
> > >Could you give any evidence for this fact?
> >
> > Every functioning democratic body uses it, with rare exceptions.
> > Supermajority rules are used commonly for routine protection of
> > minority positions, but the majority can suspend the rules if they
> > consider it necessary. This is standard practice, its everywhere that
> > people make decisions by discussion and vote.
> >
> > Some special situations use supermajority rules routinely. They have
> > not proven themselves stable over the long term, and I've seen a lot
> > of evidence that, so far, we don't know how to do consensus long
> > term.
> >
> > Interestingly, this whole discussion has brought out a way in which
> > it might be managed. Theoretically, at least, the best decision
> > would, in fact, enjoy consensus from every *rational* voter. But, of
> > course, not all voters are rational nor would I want them to be.
> >
> > > > Point is, when you don't have majority rule, you have decisions
> > > > being made by something *other* than the majority, even if it is
> > > > only the default "decision" to change nothing. And a determined
> > > > minority can then hold its right to withhold consent over the
> > > > rest of the community, in order to get what it wants. Again, it
> > > > would never, in that context, blatantly do this, but it happens,
> > > > social dynamics do not disappear in consensus communities.
> > >
> > >Therefore I don't consider consensus as a parcticable idea in all
> > > situations.
> >
> > It's practical when you can set up and maintain the conditions. I
> > think I've figured out how to do that. But I do *not* grant consensus
> > the right to coerce the majority.... rather, I *encourage* the
> > majority to seek consensus, because it is efficient and powerful. A
> > society that can find it will prosper.
> >
> > > > There is nothing magic about 50%, it is simply the point where
> > > > there are more people on one side than another, there are more
> > > > saying Yes to a motion than No. Or the reverse. In real
> > > > communities, other than seriously unhealthy ones, the majority is
> > > > restrained. It does not make decisions based on mere majority,
> > > > ordinarily, it seeks broader consent, and deliberative process
> > > > makes this happen.
> > >
> > >You repeat this, but could you give evidence for this claim?
> >
> > Not now. It would take a book. Go out and participate in some
> > deliberative bodies, in organizations where people are friendly and
> > cooperative. It's not all that unusual! Go study the foundations of
> > democracy. A lot has been written on it, for centuries.
> >
> > > > > > The original conditions assume commensurability of utilities,
> > > > >
> > > > >No, definitely not! I would never propose such a thing! I only
> > > > > said that those who believe in such measures may interpret the
> > > > > given numbers in that way...
> > > >
> > > > If the utilities are not commensurable, then there is no way to
> > > > know who is the best winner. If Jobst does not understand that,
> > > > if he does not understand how normalization -- and these are
> > > > clearly normalized utilities, can distort the results, we could
> > > > explain it for him.
> > >
> > >I gave a reasoning why C is the better solution than A.
> >
> > I took it apart, and there was no reason there, only a shell, an
> > appearance.
> >
> > >  Commensurable utilities are nonsense in my opinion. Nice for use
> > > in models but no evidence for them.
> >
> > Blatant denial. I gave an example of travel distances. Does Jobst
> > mean that travel distances don't exist? What does he mean?
> >
> > I'm starting to think that what he means is "I'm right and I'm not
> > going to acknowledge it."
> >
> > If so, too bad. I don't have time for much more.
> >
> > > > Essentially, the C-election 20% preference loss of the A voters
> > > > could have an absolute value greater than the 60% gain by the C
> > > > voters. A negotiation would expose that, because a negotiation,
> > > > "You give us this in exchange for that" causes the utilities to
> > > > be translated to commensurable units, the units of the
> > > > negotiation. As I mentioned, it does not have to be money.
> > >
> > >So what unit will it be then if not money? Please be more precise,
> >
> > First of all, money is adequate as an example. It is, after all,
> > intended as a universal medium of exchange. But for another example,
> > volunteer labor could cut a road through a previously impassable
> > area, allowing faster travel for the faction that otherwise would
> > suffer a loss.
> >
> > Such compromise happens all the time in legislation. A bill is not
> > going to pass as-is; some additional provisions are added that
> > ameliorate costs for some faction or improve benefits for another.
> >
> > > > The assumption that Jobst easily makes, that the C option is more
> > > > just, is based on an assumption of commensurability of utilities
> > >
> > >It is not. Please stop attributing thoughts to me which I never
> > > expressed.
> >
> > That's correct. I was wrong. Jobst is not basing it on such an
> > assumption. I thought he was because it would make his comments
> > rational. They are not. They assert justice *with no basis at all*.
> > They assert justice for an action that could be taking from the poor
> > and giving to the rich.
> >
> > His assertion that utilities are meaningless is asserting that all
> > these conditions are meaningless, all that matters is the abstraction
> > that, from sincere ratings -- which he essentially says have nothing
> > to do with value but only with -- what? -- he can assert that a
> > certain choice is a clear compromise, and such a compromise, it seems
> > he asserts, is necessarily just.
> >
> > I lose a dollar or gain a dollar. You lose no arm or two arms. I
> > know! We'll compromise! I'll go for no loss or gain, and you lose
> > only one arm.
> >
> > This is what ratings abstracted from actual utilities can imply.
> >
> > Fortunately, with Range Voting, all that a voter is doing is deciding
> > to cast no vote, a full vote, or something in between, for each of
> > the candidates.... S.U. theory tells us that if voters vote sincerely
> > -- which is usually left conveniently undefined -- Range voting
> > optimizes S.U., which is a tautology, if "sincere voting" means
> > voting absolute utilities. With a Clarke tax, it might mean just
> > that.
> >
> > But Range voting works quite well with normalized relative utilities,
> > or similarly exaggerated ones, which *on average* will correspond
> > fairly closely -- usually -- to absolute utilities, for the purpose
> > of aggregation and decision.
> >
> > >(I stopped reading your post here because it was getting too nasty.)
> >
> > I write about what I can see. Sometimes I'm too blunt. Sorry.
>