[Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 03:58 PM 8/27/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>A democratic decision system should not reproduce what would happen 
>in an anarchic world such as you describe but should instead protect 
>the weaker parts of society against the majority by giving them 
>their just share of power instead of letting the majority always 
>overrule them.

Missed here is the background. Oligarchical systems arose out of the 
state of nature because of their superior organization. I was today 
thinking about the theory behind plurality voting.

The faction with the largest number of supporters could raise the 
largest army (other things being equal) and could overpower the 
others -- unless they cooperate, forming a larger faction.

Democratic decision systems avoid the necessity of fighting to prove 
strength by assuming strength from numbers and making the necessary 
accomodations.

While we may think of the goal of democracy as being "to be more 
just," or whatever, it has to work on a power level, that is, if a 
democratic system attempts to take power from the powerful, it must 
have, itself, more power, or we end up with conflict that damages 
all. There is nothing worse than an even match in war, it can leave 
all sides demolished. It's quite possibly better to lose!

(And, obviously, much better not to fight if it can be avoided.)

I'm not sure at all what a "just share of power" is. What is the 
standard? If we have electoral democracy, or direct democracy, 
everyone has the same power, one vote. This entity that supposedly 
has oppressive power is not a person, nor is it, generally, a 
faction. The "majority" is merely a grouping in any decision, the 
grouping that outnumbers the other.

And in pure democratic process, there are only two groups, and no 
decision is made unless one outnumbers the others. I.e., if the Yes 
faction outnumbers, the No faction, the motion prevails; otherwise, it fails.

(There is actually a bias against the participation of the presiding 
officer, who cannot generally vote to create a tie, he or she can 
only vote to break one. Ties in pure process are *not* resolved by 
tossing a coin! A tie means that the motion fails. A majority has not 
consented to it.)

Giving the "minority" a "share of power" means making decisions 
contrary to the consent of the majority. But "sharing power" is not a 
goal of democracy; rather, the common welfare is. The goal is to make 
wise decisions; a rough standard of wisdom is consensus; but it is 
considered, sometimes, necessary to make decisions without consensus, 
so a *minimum* standard is set, and the minimum is obvious: a 
majority. Below that point, the thinking would go, it is more likely 
that the proposed action is unwise than that it is wise.

Democracy uses, aggregates, the *judgement* of the people. It is not 
a grant of power; the people have their power, and it is not 
something given to them by government; rather, government derives its 
power from the people governed. And government is most effective and 
efficient and powerful the more it is true that the people consent to 
it and participate in it voluntarily.

Jobst has not thought these matters through, it appears. Good 
election methods do a good job of choosing, efficiently, from ballot 
analysis, what the people would choose if blessed with the time and 
opportunity to discuss and use full deliberative process. While this 
goal is *impossible*, because deliberative process is intelligent, it 
*develops* decisions rather than merely discovering them through 
counting, methods can approach, at least, what would be chosen if 
people stuck with their immediate opinions.

Deliberative process will choose the Condorcet winner but it will 
also discover Condorcet cycles and could deal with them -- but I've 
never heard of it happening. However, there is, sometimes, a better 
winner than the Condorcet winner based on naive preferences. 
Deliberative process will ordinarily bring this out.

I differ with at least one active Range proponent in disliking that a 
Range winner be imposed on an unwilling majority. But a true Range 
winner will almost always be accepted by a majority, even when the 
initial preferences of the majority would have indicated otherwise. 
And it has nothing to do with "altruism." It is, in fact, in the 
interest of all, generally, to do this.

There is an issue raised with this by a writer here who 
misunderstands what is being said. He thinks that Range advocates 
depend on "altruism," a not uncommon assertion. We don't. Indeed, 
Range functions quite well with maximally self-interested votes, and, 
contrary to common assertion, Approval-style voting or bullet voting 
are *not* always the optimal votes.

Based on narrow considerations, neglecting the multiple purposes that 
election serve, some assert that personal expected utility is always 
maximized by approval style voting. But if one looks closely, a more 
sincere vote can be just as efficient, and given the other purposes 
(such as expressing support for a third party in order to shift the 
position of a major party), can be more efficient.

> > If C wins, the B supporters gain 60% utility, that's large. If they
> > pay the A voters the equivalent of the A loss, 20%, they are still
> > way ahead.
>
>You still assume that their is a "loss" to the A voters.

Comparatively, yes. And I gave an example showing that.

>  But that is just wrong: the A voters have no right to the election 
> of A, it is not their property which they can "loose".

Lose.

Let me put it this way: you assert this, but you have done nothing 
that establishes that the majority does *not* have the right to its 
preference. It can *take* its preference, generally. Why shouldn't it?

Every legislative body in actual existence, with actual sovereignty, 
gives the majority this power. On what basis do you assert that this 
is not a right?

I agree that it is not an absolute right. "Rights" are conventions 
established to guide society; I have no "right" not to be eaten by a 
lion. I have only the power to prevent it, if I do. We grant the 
majority the right of decision because the alternative is *worse*.

Most societies establish boundaries over the power of the majority, 
preventing it from oppressing minorities without justice. However, 
the majority can always circumvent these boundaries *if it cares to*. 
Sometimes majority must be specially defined: we ordinarily speak of 
relative majorities in elections. However, under common rules, an 
*absolute* majority has special power. For example, it can amend 
bylaws without notice. It's worth looking at this.

The U.S. Senate, and all deliberative bodies, has cloture rules. 
Generally, it takes a supermajority to close debate. The argument for 
this is that it is in the interests of all that minorities fully 
express their views, are given the maximum opportunity to prevail; 
cloture rules requiring a supermajority protect the assembly from 
making premature decisions.

However, the majority can change the rules, effectively. It is quite 
rare for it to do so, simply to win some motion, for it is widely 
recognized how dangerous it is. But, in fact, if a majority considers 
it *urgent* that a motion be passed, if it considers that great harm 
will ensue if we fail to act, to fail to act is to impose a decision 
contrary to the consent of the majority, a decision to *wait*. So the 
majority really *can* decide to proceed, in an emergency. It will 
almost never do this, in any sane society. It will only do it in an emergency.

One of the great hazards we faced in recent years was the emergence 
of a leadership in the Republican Party quite willing to bypass these 
safeguards, in the U.S. Senate, for narrow and partisan purpose, not 
actual emergencies. However, it took only a few Senators from both 
parties willing to cooperate to prevent it to avoid setting the 
precedent. I'm not sure, however, that this was wise.... for the 
agreement was, from the Democratic side, to join in the cloture vote 
if certain conditions were met, and the result has been the continued 
packing of the federal judiciary....

I want to underline one point made here. The "majority" is not a 
person or faction in the ordinary sense. We confuse "majority" with 
"majority party," which often is not a majority at all, but a 
plurality. And parties are not monolithic.

And the majority has tremendous power, if it chooses to exercise it. 
In California, several Supreme Court justices were recalled. It took 
only a majority vote. The effect was to shift the power balance on 
the court in a way more pleasing to the majority. I'm not at all 
saying that this was good, it wasn't. But the problem was with the 
political process and the lack of organization to protect those 
justices -- who had not been abusing their positions -- not with the 
power of the majority. It properly has that power.

> > It is a very good deal for the B voters
>
>No, they would have to pay for a solution which I think they have a right to!

What is the basis for this *right*?

Jobst asserts that the A voters do not "lose" anything by getting C, 
because they, allegedly, have no right to A. But whether or not they 
lose anything has nothing to do with rights. If they get A, they have 
a certain value. If they get C, they have less value. That is the 
meaning of "lose." It is a relative term.

The ratings given by Jobst, we were allowed to assume, are "sincere 
utilities." And part of the condition was that they are 
commensurable. However, the neutral value was not given. Suppose that 
the neutral position, for the A voters, is the choice of A. If A is 
chosen, they lose nothing, they gain nothing. If C is chosen, they 
lose a certain value, and if B is chosen, they lose five times that 
amount. This is consistent with "sincere utilities," which Jobst says 
he does not believe in, though clearly it can have meaning, and, 
under some conditions, it could even be measured.

Whereas the B voters, I could assert, again consistently with their 
ratings, might have a neutral position also with A. If A is chosen, 
they neither gain nor lose value. If C is chosen, they gain a certain 
value; if B is chosen, they gain 5/4 that value.

These statements of gain and loss are entirely consistent with the 
ratings given, they make them rational and sincere.

Now, if we assume that the range of values is the same for all 
voters, and that one of A, B, or C must be chosen, how can you assert 
that the A voters don't lose anything by the choice of C?

Jobst, it's preposterous. You are out on a limb. The sooner you can 
see it, the less embarrassing it will be....

Now, as describe, A is the choice that leaves everyone in neutral 
position. Clearly, A is a *just* choice, it harms nobody. (Given the 
conditions as I've further specified them.)

However, the B voters could get a much better outcome. But it would 
cost the A voters something. What in the world is wrong with them 
offering to compensate the A voters for their loss?

If they offer the A voters more than the A voters will lose by the 
adoption of C, then it is win-win. Obviously, there would be no 
motive for them to offer more than the election of C is worth to 
them.... but they could offer anything below that and be ahead.

Consideration of the common welfare would indicate that some transfer 
would be appropriate, to more evenly distribute the benefit of the 
gain possible through S.U. maximization, as would happen with sincere 
Range Votes in a case like this. There is *overall* gain, but it is 
not evenly distributed.

What if the majority is poor and the minority is rich? Would you 
still think it "just" to take this value from the poor and give it to the rich?

> > Jobst regards it as unjust that the majority should be paid by the
> > minority to get an outcome he regards as more just. However, he isn't
> > looking at the utilities
>
>No. Why must I repeat over and over again that I don't believe in 
>measurable utility. I interpret the numbers I gave in the example in 
>the way I describes several times: as representing preferences over lotteries!

This is a common error. An assumption that utilities are not 
measurable ignores that we may, in studying a situation, *posit* 
utilities. The utilities then provide an explanation for preferences 
and an understanding of preference strengths. To really study 
situations like this, one needs to look at absolute and commensurable 
utilities, which, again, can be posited. Jobst started with 
*relative* utilities, normalized, which are of limited use in 
studying the justice of a situation. Quite simply, as I believe I 
showed, the justice could radically change depending on the 
underlying absolute utilities, which can have greatly different 
meaning than the normalized, relative ones.

(when we assumed, here, that the utilities were commensurable, we 
made no assumption about the neutral position. What we assumed was 
that summing the utilities would produce meaningful anticipation of 
the overall value to society. It is *as if* there were cash values 
associated with the utilities, though that does introduce the 
possible problem that the same amount of cash may have differing 
value to different people.

When transfers are considered, though, the transfers, if voluntarily 
accepted, act to equalize value, the transfers make the utilities 
commensurable. There would be a better way to say this, ... but it's late.


> > The actual
> > consequences of the election are irrelevant to him.
>
>What do you think you do here? Where did I say such a thing? The 
>actual consequences should of course be that the obvious compromise 
>solution C should be elected without anyone having to "pay" for it!

Where does this "should" come from? Is it based on public benefit? 
What's the basis?

Jobst considers C "obvious" because he is making certain unstated 
assumptions. I'm not making those assumptions.

One thing is clear. It would seem equitable to me that the costs and 
benefits of public cooperation should be equally distributed, to the 
extent possible. If this is true, then the transfers I suggested 
would be just. How to determine them is another matter. The most 
obvious way is by free offer and acceptance. Ideally, with such, we 
could get a situation where all voters would rationally settle on a 
single outcome. Consensus.

Yet Jobst, apparently, would consider this unjust. Why should anyone 
have to "pay" for the "obvious compromise"?

Well, why should one faction get a large benefit and another one a 
smaller benefit, if we assume that all the utilities are positive? 
Why should one faction get a loss while another gets a gain? -- under 
other assumptions about the absolute utilities consistent with the ratings.

*If* we could somehow guarantee that utilities are sincere, we could 
maximize overall benefit, meaning that, if it were distributed 
equally, *all* would benefit the most from the maximizing choice.

Commonly, it's asserted that Range Voting is great with sincere 
voters, but, of course, voters won't be sincere, so forgeddaboudit. 
It's an error for two reasons: one is that Range works quite well 
with strategic voters, and sincere voters, as long as they vote 
*intelligently* -- which is also sincere, but not in a naive way -- 
do just as well or better, no matter how everyone else votes. The 
other is that something like a Clarke tax could act to simultaneously 
encourage sincere voting and the distribution of benefit.

Here, I suggested a way to do it without changes in law. All it would 
take is sufficient organization of the people, for both the majority 
and minority would need to be organized to be able to effectively 
negotiate the consensus.

That, of course, is quite a trick, but I think it can be done. 
Indeed, I think it *will* be done. It is far too obvious, inertia 
means that movement is slow, but inexorable.


> > But this is a democracy.
>
>What is the "this" you are referring to?

Well, presumably, what we are discussing.

> > Sure, one can imagine systems where majority
> > rule is not sufficient for making decisions,
>
>I cannot imagine a system where majority rule *is* sufficient for 
>making really *democratic* decisions.

Again, the resolution of the apparent disagreement comes if we 
understand "democracy" as a goal or standard, rather than something 
completely realizable, and that it applies to each decision made by a 
society. There are *degrees* of democracy, and there is a *minimum* 
standard for democracy. We have *total* democracy when we have full 
consensus. And we have minimal democracy when a majority consents to 
a decision. Below that level it is not democracy at all, it is 
oligarchy and coercion.

> > Contrary to what Jobst might assume, I have a lot of experience
> > with consensus communities, both positive and negative.
>
>I don't assume anything about your experience and have never said 
>so. But please keep in mind that consensus is a much different thing 
>from majority rule.

Duh!

>  I should think my example makes this very clear: No consensus 
> about A nor about B, only consensus about B being nearly as good!

Sure. But context matters. Actually, the example was that C was nearly as good.


> > However, when you get down to the nuts and bolts of a system,
> > *including how the system is implemented,* majority rule has proven
> > itself to be practical *and* sustainable.
>
>Could you give any evidence for this fact?

Every functioning democratic body uses it, with rare exceptions. 
Supermajority rules are used commonly for routine protection of 
minority positions, but the majority can suspend the rules if they 
consider it necessary. This is standard practice, its everywhere that 
people make decisions by discussion and vote.

Some special situations use supermajority rules routinely. They have 
not proven themselves stable over the long term, and I've seen a lot 
of evidence that, so far, we don't know how to do consensus long term.

Interestingly, this whole discussion has brought out a way in which 
it might be managed. Theoretically, at least, the best decision 
would, in fact, enjoy consensus from every *rational* voter. But, of 
course, not all voters are rational nor would I want them to be.


> > Point is, when you don't have majority rule, you have decisions being
> > made by something *other* than the majority, even if it is only the
> > default "decision" to change nothing. And a determined minority can
> > then hold its right to withhold consent over the rest of the
> > community, in order to get what it wants. Again, it would never, in
> > that context, blatantly do this, but it happens, social dynamics do
> > not disappear in consensus communities.
>
>Therefore I don't consider consensus as a parcticable idea in all situations.

It's practical when you can set up and maintain the conditions. I 
think I've figured out how to do that. But I do *not* grant consensus 
the right to coerce the majority.... rather, I *encourage* the 
majority to seek consensus, because it is efficient and powerful. A 
society that can find it will prosper.

> > There is nothing magic about 50%, it is simply the point where there
> > are more people on one side than another, there are more saying Yes
> > to a motion than No. Or the reverse. In real communities, other than
> > seriously unhealthy ones, the majority is restrained. It does not
> > make decisions based on mere majority, ordinarily, it seeks broader
> > consent, and deliberative process makes this happen.
>
>You repeat this, but could you give evidence for this claim?

Not now. It would take a book. Go out and participate in some 
deliberative bodies, in organizations where people are friendly and 
cooperative. It's not all that unusual! Go study the foundations of 
democracy. A lot has been written on it, for centuries.

> > > > The original conditions assume commensurability of utilities,
> > >
> > >No, definitely not! I would never propose such a thing! I only said
> > >that those who believe in such measures may interpret the given
> > >numbers in that way...
> >
> > If the utilities are not commensurable, then there is no way to know
> > who is the best winner. If Jobst does not understand that, if he does
> > not understand how normalization -- and these are clearly normalized
> > utilities, can distort the results, we could explain it for him.
>
>I gave a reasoning why C is the better solution than A.

I took it apart, and there was no reason there, only a shell, an appearance.

>  Commensurable utilities are nonsense in my opinion. Nice for use 
> in models but no evidence for them.

Blatant denial. I gave an example of travel distances. Does Jobst 
mean that travel distances don't exist? What does he mean?

I'm starting to think that what he means is "I'm right and I'm not 
going to acknowledge it."

If so, too bad. I don't have time for much more.

> > Essentially, the C-election 20% preference loss of the A voters could
> > have an absolute value greater than the 60% gain by the C voters. A
> > negotiation would expose that, because a negotiation, "You give us
> > this in exchange for that" causes the utilities to be translated to
> > commensurable units, the units of the negotiation. As I mentioned, it
> > does not have to be money.
>
>So what unit will it be then if not money? Please be more precise,

First of all, money is adequate as an example. It is, after all, 
intended as a universal medium of exchange. But for another example, 
volunteer labor could cut a road through a previously impassable 
area, allowing faster travel for the faction that otherwise would 
suffer a loss.

Such compromise happens all the time in legislation. A bill is not 
going to pass as-is; some additional provisions are added that 
ameliorate costs for some faction or improve benefits for another.


> > The assumption that Jobst easily makes, that the C option is more
> > just, is based on an assumption of commensurability of utilities
>
>It is not. Please stop attributing thoughts to me which I never expressed.

That's correct. I was wrong. Jobst is not basing it on such an 
assumption. I thought he was because it would make his comments 
rational. They are not. They assert justice *with no basis at all*. 
They assert justice for an action that could be taking from the poor 
and giving to the rich.

His assertion that utilities are meaningless is asserting that all 
these conditions are meaningless, all that matters is the abstraction 
that, from sincere ratings -- which he essentially says have nothing 
to do with value but only with -- what? -- he can assert that a 
certain choice is a clear compromise, and such a compromise, it seems 
he asserts, is necessarily just.

I lose a dollar or gain a dollar. You lose no arm or two arms. I 
know! We'll compromise! I'll go for no loss or gain, and you lose only one arm.

This is what ratings abstracted from actual utilities can imply.

Fortunately, with Range Voting, all that a voter is doing is deciding 
to cast no vote, a full vote, or something in between, for each of 
the candidates.... S.U. theory tells us that if voters vote sincerely 
-- which is usually left conveniently undefined -- Range voting 
optimizes S.U., which is a tautology, if "sincere voting" means 
voting absolute utilities. With a Clarke tax, it might mean just that.

But Range voting works quite well with normalized relative utilities, 
or similarly exaggerated ones, which *on average* will correspond 
fairly closely -- usually -- to absolute utilities, for the purpose 
of aggregation and decision.

>(I stopped reading your post here because it was getting too nasty.)

I write about what I can see. Sometimes I'm too blunt. Sorry.