[Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Steve,

> Although Jobst may not have intended this assumption, I will continue to 
> make the assumption that the B minority's preference intensity for the 
> compromise C over A is much greater than the A majority's preference 
> intensity for A over C. 

Sorry, I had just not read carefully the first time. Of course that interpretation is consistent with what I had in mind, although I do not believe that preference "intensities" belonging to different persons can be compared.

> (I am NOT saying there is a way to measure or 
> compare sincere preference intensities or utilities suitable for input 
> into a good vote tallying algorithm.)  Without an assumption like this, 
> we would have no reason to believe C is better than A for the society.

I think we have! The reasoning is this: 55% like A best, 45% like B best. Therefore the "democratic benchmark" solution with which we should compare prospective solutions is the lottery that elects A with 55% probability and B with 45% probability. Now, all voters prefer C to this benchmark, but only 55% prefer A to this benchmark and only 45% prefer B to the benchmark. From this point of view C is a better solution than A is.

But I hope that also without this kind of reasoning it should be obvious that a compromise which everybody likes almost as most as her favourite is a better election outcome than one of the polar favourites...

> In other words, I believe 
> we should confine ourselves to solving the "Tyranny of the Nearly 
> Indifferent Majority" but not try to solve the "Tyranny of the 
> Passionate Majority."

You suggest not to solve the problem of the "Tyranny of the Passionate Majority"? Why? Shouldn't problems be solved?

> In the real world, it is much easier to elect a compromise than Mr. 
> Lomax seems to be saying below, because in the real world the set of 
> alternatives is not fixed to {A,B,C} by nature (nor by Jobst).  Most 
> procedures allow a very small minority to add an alternative to the set 
> being voted on. (Under Robert's Rules of Order, for instance, only two 
> people are required: one to propose alternative D and the other to 
> "second" the proposal.)

It seems you and Adb ul-Rahman try to convince us that the problem I posed does not exist in the real world. Well, if you really think so, I can't help it.

Anyway, it would be nice if you could still give a hint what kind of method you would suggest to solve the stated problem *assuming* that the problem exists :-)

Yours, Jobst

_______________________________________________________________________
Jetzt neu! Schützen Sie Ihren PC mit McAfee und WEB.DE. 3 Monate
kostenlos testen. http://www.pc-sicherheit.web.de/startseite/?mc=022220