[Election-Methods] RE : Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section

[Kevin Venzke]

Juho,

--- Juho <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
> >>> In the first round you vote FOR one candidate. You also vote
> >>> AGAINST one
> >>> candidate. If someone has more than half of the FOR votes, they are
> >>> elected. If someone has more than half of the AGAINST votes, they  
> >>> are
> >>> disqualified. Then the second round is between the two candidates  
> >>> with
> >>> the most FOR votes who have not been disqualified.
> >>
> >> I'm always a bit careful with the "against" votes. If there are e.g.
> >> three strong parties the supporters of the other parties might vote
> >> the candidate of one party out.
> >
> > ???
> 
> My comment was indeed quite confusing. I guess I was in a hurry to  
> reach the end of the mail.
> 
> This method doesn't seem to be as bad with negative votes as some  
> other methods are but there are some risks e.g. in the following  
> example. There are three candidates with first place support 40 A, 30  
> B, 30 C. Later preferences are not strong. B supporters notice that  
> if the final round will be between B and A it looks quite probable  
> that A would win. Therefore they give their AGAINST vote to A. C  
> supporters follow the same logic. A gets >50% AGAINST votes. The  
> problem is that the AGAINST votes were strategic and not sincere  
> (many of them at least). A could have been the best candidate (with  
> 40% support).

If this is the worst thing that occurs, I am not worried. The A voters
at least have an opportunity to make a selection between B and C in
the second round.

Also, this example doesn't seem to envision any sort of political
spectrum beneath the candidates and voters, which to my mind is not
very realistic. In a setting where that is realistic, I could not
really advocate this method.

Kevin Venzke


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