[Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff

[Diego Renato]

2007/8/15, Dave Ketchum:
>
> On most elections many, if not most, voters' preference will be a single
> candidate.  Why is this something to fight?
>       One candidate can overshadow the competition.
>       Voters can be loyal to their party.

For occasional exception elections there will be more interest in voting
> for multiple candidates, and it is DESIRABLE to support this voting for
> whichever elections may inspire voter interest in such.
>
> Fighting complications that make the rules for deciding on winners hard to
>
> understand make such complications undesirable unless they provide major
> benefits.
>
> DWK
>
>
Your viewpoint is biased to two-party system. In multi-party democracies,
like Brazil, your assumption is likely wrong.  No one-round voting system is
able to differentiate them. I'll try to illustrate it. Suppose an election
which three candidates (Bush, Gore, Nader) runs. These are the real
preferences of the voters:

47: Bush >> Gore > Nader
33: Gore >> Nader > Bush
10: Gore > Nader >> Bush
10: Nader > Gore >> Bush

Under honest approval voting, Gore receives 53 approvals, Bush 43 and Nader
20. Gore wins. It looks fair to me.

However, note that Nader voters voted honestly because they were sure that
Nader is not likely to win. Instead of, if is not known the winner of a
pairwise comparison between Gore and Nader, there is incentive for bullet
voting. This is the reason of Bucklin is no longer used in US.

47: Bush >> Gore > Nader
27: Gore > Nader >> Bush (honest); Gore >> Nader > Bush (strategic)
26: Nader > Gore >> Buch (honest);  Nader >> Gore > Bush (strategic)

Bush wins the first rount, but loses for Gore in a runoff (IAR). With
strategic voting, the spoiler effect is possible under simple approval.

________________________________
Diego Santos
Aluno de Ciência da Computação
Integrante do projeto Wireless(Petrobras/DEE-UFCG)
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20070816/52474c8e/attachment-0003.htm>