[Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Wed Aug 15 21:42:47 PDT 2007


On Thu, 16 Aug 2007 01:04:21 +0100 James Gilmour wrote:
> Dave Ketchum> Sent: 15 August 2007 22:57
> 
>>On most elections many, if not most, voters' preference will be a single 
>>candidate.
> 
> 
> On what basis do you say that?  Surely it is, to a very great extent, a function of the voting system.  If the voting
> system says (directly or indirectly) "pick one winner", then the voter's preference will be one candidate.  It will also
> apply when there are only two candidates contesting the seat.
> 
First, I am writing from and for the US, where we have MANY elective 
offices.  While some offices have the potential for attracting more 
candidates if supported by a good election method, many will not often 
attract more than a couple of serious candidates.

When there is no good reason for more than a couple candidates, Plurality 
would be good enough - though I propose installing better voting methods 
to give their flexibility whenever it would be useful.
> 
> 
>> Why is this something to fight?
> 
> 
> This is not something to "fight", but it seems reasonable to offer the voters a more sensitive voting system so that
> those voters who wish can express their preferences more fully, if we can devise such a voting system.
> 
As I say above, the voting method should support voters selecting multiple 
candidates.

The problem to fight is twisting voters' arms to encourage them to select 
more candidates than their desires support.
> 
>>      One candidate can overshadow the competition.
> 
> 
> True, but not always the case.
> 
> 
>>      Voters can be loyal to their party.
> 
> 
> True, but not always the case.
> 
> 
> 
>>For occasional exception elections there will be more interest in voting 
>>for multiple candidates, and it is DESIRABLE to support this voting for 
>>whichever elections may inspire voter interest in such.
> 
> 
> Why would such elections be "exceptional"?  Surely at every election, if the voter knows there is a chance her/his most
> preferred candidate may not win, that voter would welcome the opportunity to express one or more additional preferences
> among the other candidates that might influence the outcome?
> 
To get into this game there must be a suitable election method (assumed 
for this discussion), and a suitable collection of candidates to interest 
this voter in backing more than one of them.

Write-ins can, if they choose, become extra candidates - but this becomes 
practical only if they choose to be serious about it.
> 
> 
>>Fighting complications that make the rules for deciding on winners hard to 
>>understand make such complications undesirable unless they provide major 
>>benefits.
> 
> 
> Avoidable complication is always to be avoided.  If the rules for your "new" voting system are too hard to understand
> the electors will not support your proposed reform.

You seem to echo my thought.
> 
> James Gilmour

See also my related post:
[Election-Methods] Plurality + Approval + Condorcet.
Sat, 04 Aug 2007 18:10:05 -0400
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.






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