[Election-Methods] Two replies

[Juho]

On Aug 12, 2007, at 6:40 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> The extension of "strategic" to include votes which involve  
> expressing an equal rating for candidates when the voter actually  
> has a preference is, in my view, properly controversial.

I'm ok with any stable definition.

> Now, in a real election, this voting pattern is extremely unlikely.

Yes, the voting pattern in the example is exaggerated. Casting "weak"  
votes is possible in practically any set-up and they may influence  
the outcome in many.

> Juho has asserted that these are sincere utilities, but he has  
> totally avoided the question of what they mean. What *kind* of  
> sincere utilities?

I'm ok with any kind.

> He is not explicit about what he is comparing the method with. Bad  
> compared to what? Or just *absolutely* bad?

I compared use of weak and strong votes within Range.

> Juho did not provide us a basis for concluding that R1 and D are  
> better winners. To conclude that, we would have to know how to  
> compare the utilities of the D, R1, and R2 winners. The utilities  
> he stated are "half-normalized." That's odd. In order to compare  
> and sum S.U., the ranges of utilities need to be tied to each other  
> in some way, so that they are commensurable, so that summing them  
> has meaning.
>
> I discussed this at some length, but it seems it sailed past Juho.

Your scenarios are ok to me. I accept any way of determining utilities.

> No election has had a "bad" outcome if all the voters consider it a  
> good one! And Juho ackowledged above that the Ds considered R2 "not  
> a poor choice."
>
> Not a poor choice is, quite simply, not a "bad" choice.

Yes, and R2 had the worst in S.U. in this example.

Juho




	
	
		
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