[Election-Methods] RE : Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section

Juho juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Thu Aug 9 10:16:13 PDT 2007


Kevin Venzke wrote:

> We could also adjust it to e.g. 49 A, 5 B, 46 C>B, with a significant
> number of the 49 voting A>B.
>
> My issue is not simply that C voters have strategic incentive here.  
> It's
> that the incentive is to abandon candidates who aren't frontrunners;
> that it is practically risk-free; and that if the C voters don't use
> the strategy, their sincere votes confuse margins into picking the  
> wrong
> winner.

Some comments to this example as requested:

It seems that you have corrected the previous example (49 A, 24 B, 27  
C>B) so that it doesn't require all the A supporters to be strategic  
to introduce the vulnerabilities.

I again assume that the intended sincere opinions follow the typical  
(extreme) left-centre-right pattern, giving sincere opinions 49  
A>B>C, 5 B>A=C, 46 C>B>A.

Now the strategic pattern emerges if 11 A supporters truncate (or 10  
for a tie).

In this example the biggest problem is maybe the fact that the A  
supporters take a big risk when they do not indicate their support to  
their compromise candidate B. If their strategic calculations are not  
exactly right, and there is a one vote shift in preference away from  
the A faction and towards the C faction, then C will win. Note that  
this risk hits them sooner (with smaller number of strategic voters)  
than the benefits.

Note also that if there is a two vote shift towards the A faction  
strategic voting is not needed since A faction has majority anyway.

Note also that if the A party recommends strategic voting to take the  
victory away from B the B supporters might turn against A and give  
their (secondary) support to C, which would again easily make C the  
winner.

It may not be sensible to the A voters to risk and possibly make C  
the winner by ignoring their compromise candidate. The A party might  
as well try to make sure that all their supporters will vote A>B to  
eliminate the risk of C winning (also B supporters might like that  
and give them some additional support). Maybe you'll find another  
better set of numbers. Sorry for commenting the problems one by one.  
I don't have a complete theory and analysis available to present.

Juho



		
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