[Election-Methods] Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Sun Aug 5 15:45:13 PDT 2007


At 05:41 PM 8/3/2007, Juho wrote:
>On Aug 2, 2007, at 2:52 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>
>>Range is not as good as full deliberative process, but it is much
>>closer.
>
>I'm not convinced that pushing Range voting when the society in
>question is still in "competitive mode" automatically leads to
>improvements in the society.

Do you see me pushing Range Voting beyond Range 2?

However, if we get Range 2, many people will be pushing for more. And 
so we will start to see experiments, I'm pretty sure, with Range, of 
various resolutions.

Will this bring "automatic improvments"? No, no method on its own 
will do that. However, voters may *use* Range (from Approval on up), 
to bring improvements. If society is highly polarized and 
competitive, then Range will, for many voters, reduce to Approval. 
But some voters will use it, and it appears that this brings quite a 
benefit. I have not investigated the phenomenon sufficiently, but it 
may be that the system having a resolution finer than one vote, even 
if nearly everyone votes Approval, improves the accuracy. Introducing 
noise improves the effective resolution of binary data....

>  I think use of Range as a poll (rather
>than directly as a voting method) could be more efficient in making
>the varying and rich opinion of people visible and thereby feeding
>the deliberative process.

Absolutely. Now, how do we get deliberative process, how do we 
encourage it? I've been reading Assault on Reason, by Al Gore. He 
spot on, with many things, and I now have some crackerjack FA/DP 
quotes, I'm sure you will be seeing. Turns out that Montesquieu quite 
succinctly stated a big chunk of the theoretical basis for FA/DP, 
and, I had not noticed the congruence, but the judicial system in the 
tripartite U.S. is, in a way, suppose to be *like* a Free Association.

>  I mean that if Range is used fully or
>partly in Approval style, the information it carries through is
>leaner and maybe coloured with strategic considerations. Poll type
>Range of the other hand can be used for argumentation in the
>deliberative discussions.

Sure. Or, more accurately, it simply measures the degree of consensus 
on an issue.

Ask people what their favorite pizza is, and you get certain 
information. Ask them what pizzas are acceptable to them, you get 
different information. Ask them to *rate* pizzas, and you get far 
more accurate information. If you goal is maximum overall 
satisfaction, you would certainly prefer Range information. If you 
are compromised by the need to make a quick decision, you might want Approval.

And if you want polarization and competition, you'll love Plurality.

>Rating based ballots that are used to derive ranking based ballots is
>one option that may have additional value in a society that aims at
>developing the deliberative process in new ways.

My thinking exactly. When the Range and Condorcet winners differ, 
there is a kind of disconnect. What does it mean? This deserves discussion!

>  Also the second
>round where decision between Range and Condorcet winner is made may
>add some value. In a competitive environment the majority may just
>vote just as in the first round and typically not change the end
>result.

Actually, this is not likely, even in a competitive environment, 
*unless* the majority understated their preference, in which case 
they may well stick with their favorite. The runoff tests that!

>  But the additional round of thinking and deliberation may be
>useful anyway. Btw it may be as good or better to use Range+Condorcet
>also at the second round.

Theoretically, you would. In practice, it may not add sufficient value.

*Complete* process asks the electorate if they accept the election, Yes/No.

>  Picking two alternatives for the second
>round may be limiting.

Yes, but efficient. Remember, we are talking about election methods 
as distinct from full deliberative process, which quite carefully 
winnows out candidates one at a time.

>  And use of the same method shows the results
>of the deliberative process. If you want to have a decisive vote at
>the end, the theoretically cleanest approach might be to vote
>potentially after every round if the outcome of that round should be
>considered final

In deliberative process, nothing is final unless the voters declare 
it final. You are suggesting that they bind themselves. Why would 
they want to do that?

>  (Range or Condorcet winner or even someone else as
>derived from the votes or as proposed by the chairman) or if the
>deliberative process should still continue (for one or more rounds in
>election technical terms).
>
>Juho

Again, in full process, anyone may move that the organization elect 
So-and-So. Anyone may move that this be amended. Anyone can move that 
a poll be taken. Etc., etc.

There may be established rules, and sometimes the rules limit what 
can be done. But then anyone may move that the rules be suspended, etc., etc.




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