[Election-Methods] Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section

[Juho]

On Aug 2, 2007, at 16:26 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 02:04 AM 8/2/2007, Juho wrote:
>> The votres' "stated preferences" are easy to collect but in a
>> competitive environment voters tend to exaggerate. I guess the basic
>> problem is the feeling you get when Bush wins Gore and you have voter
>> G=100, B=80 and your neighbour has voted B=100, G=0.
>
> But your neighbor cared more than you. Look, the kind of example  
> you cited is very common. In this election, you actually have very  
> little motive to vote (of those are the frontrunners).
>
> You cared very little, your neighbor cared enough to vote as the  
> neighbor did. If there were two people making the decision, which  
> one would be right?
>
> "I prefer Gore, but Bush is fine with me."
> "I prefer Bush, and Gore is awful."
>
> Which one is the choice that makes that neighborhood a nicer place  
> to live?

Sincere and positive attitudes are good in the society. In election  
methods it is a problem, as recently often stated, to give more  
voting power to the most extreme opinions (that may not be sincere  
but exaggerated).

Your words btw now give the impression that voters who care should  
vote in Approval style.

> The assumption is that voters don't vote their *true* preferences,  
> and then are upset about the result. If you'd be upset, your true  
> preference is not 100/80. Why in the world did you vote that way if  
> Bush was not acceptable to you?

I thought me and my neighbour both had a 100/80 opinion (but in  
reverse directions). The neighbour just exaggerated. Maybe there were  
also other candidates who really were worth 0 (80 points worse than  
Bush) and therefore Rating Bush at 0 would have falsified my opinions.

Juho



	
	
		
___________________________________________________________ 
All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine 
http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html