[Election-Methods] response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting

[Warren Smith]

Response to Schudy re Range vs Approval voting

>W.Schudy:
>Summary: I believe it's better to force everyone to vote strategically
>(approval) than to give power to the candidate whose supporters
>have the most black and white, polarized view of the world.

--WDS replies:
This criticism of range voting has been heard several times
before, but Schudy perhaps has a nicer way to
phrase and view it than the previous critics, which makes his
attack overcome more of range voting's defenses.
(For some of those defenses, see, e.g.
http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html
http://rangevoting.org/ShExpRes.html .)

*1. with range voting, it is "recommended" (this could be,
by law, printed on ballots) but not "required" that voters
rate their favorite with the top score (say 99 for 0-99 range)
and their most-hated with the least score (0).

With such a recommendation, it is likely that almost all
range voters will actually do that.

If range voters max and min the two perceived-frontrunner
candidates, then they gain almost all the strategic advantages
of approval voting, while still allowing quite a lot
of honesty concerning other candidates.


*2. So for example, if
49% voted Bush=99, Gore=0, Nader=53(avg), and
49% voted Gore=99, Bush=0, Nader=53(avg), and
2% voted Nader=99, Gore=20, Bush=0
then Nader would win.

This structure is a realistic possibility that totally contradicts the
assertion RV
"gives power to the candidate whose supporters
have the most black and white, polarized view of the world."
In this case, Nader is winning despite a severe lack of polarized
Nader supporters.
(See also http://rangevoting.org/TidemanRespB.html .)

Indeed by forcing voters to vote approval-style, you would *force*
artificial "polarization" and thus distort the results by causing 
Nader to have an artificially high or low score
(probably the latter; it depends on the shape of the distribution
whose average was 53).
This is totally contrary to Schudy's claimed desire.


*3. If we also add, say, Badnarik with scores not of 53 like for
Nader, but rather, say, 20, then Badnarik would not win, 
but still would get a total range-voting
score in the same ballpark as Bush, Gore, and Nader, thus permitting
him to claim he has a lot of popular support, and thus allowing his
party to try to get money and support for future elections.


*4. However, if forced to vote approval-style, the latter possibility
is precluded, causing Badnarik and his party forever 
to get very low scores (below 1%) and never be able to
attract either money or serious candidates. 
As a result, the country would have fewer choices
since small parties would be artificially prevented from growing to
a deservedly-large size and strength. That's very bad.

Furthermore, with continued 2-party domination,
"polarization" is kind of inherent! 
Thus Schudy, by supporting approval over range,
in fact could be CAUSING huge polarization, FORCING all Nader-like
candidates to lose, and fossilizing it forever, 
preventing third parties from ever becoming significant -
exactly the opposite of what Schudy says he wants!

Note, it was an "immediate" bad effect that (above)
Approval caused Nader to lose
when Range vould have caused him to win.
But what we here are talking about is a "secondary" -
not-immediate but rather prolonged over historical time - 
effect somewhat resembling "Duverger's law" that certain
voting systems engender 2-party domination.


*5. That scenario
(the "nursery effect" http://rangevoting.org/NurseryEffect.html )
is quite plausible. See http://rangevoting.org/PsEl04.html
to see that Badnarik indeed got hugely less with
approval than with range voting.
This is a systematic effect that
hurts all third-party candidates with approval,
and hurts them hugely.


*6. We have to base our arguments on reality.
In our study of the 2004 US election, we were not able
to find any evidence that
Bush voters were either more or less "polarized" and
"strategically exaggerating"
than Gore voters. (Perhaps they were, but if so the
effect was too small for our
statistics to see.) 

This is only one election of course, so it does not mean a lot,
but still, the fact is, Schudy apparently has no evidence
that any nonuniform polarization ever exists, 
and what little evidence we do have, suggests it does not.

The point is, it is hard to make such a conspiracy work.
You have to get your suppoters
to all agree to be strategic,
AND keep this conspiracy secret so the other side
does not find out about it and try to compensate.
Realistic? Or a fantasy?


*7. Might it be somebody could have a legitimate reason
to score some preferences more strongly than others, 
and this is not because they are "polarized"?


*8. Another interesting and good -
kind of more philosophical - response to this
kind of criticism, is by Lomax:
http://rangevoting.org/TidemanRespA.html .


Warren D. Smith
http://rangevoting.org