[Election-Methods] When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet Winners but Condorcet Methods can Elect Condorcet Losers

[Peter Barath]

On 2007 July 17 Tuesday 20.21, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>It's a little-noticed fact that, in Warren Smith's IEVS simulations,
>which generate sets of voters with simulated utilities, then apply
>various voting methods and strategies, (see rangevoting.org), Range
>Voting, when voters "strategize," is actually beaten by Range with a
>top-two runoff.

It's little-noticed, indeed. Thank you for the information.

I talked to a friend who happens to be a member of Mensa Hungary
and now he wants to write an article about voting methods for the
local Mensa periodical! He has two questions:

From your words I guess you propose a real runoff in a later
time, when the results of the first round are already known.

Is this real and principal decision, or only practical?
Would it be possible either in Range or in Approval to
gain this pairwise comparison information from the
already cast votes? Maybe by Condorcet-style votes
or something? (People don't like to vote twice.)

The second question:

As far as we understand, Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn can be 
considered as foundig fathers of proposing Approval vote
in modern days (Wikipedia - Voting system says it was in use
in Venice in the 13th century!).

Who can be honoured as proposer of Approval+2 and Range+2?
Do they have the same origin?

Peter Barath
P.S.:
For your interest: Mensa Hungary uses plurality to elect
its leaders. Mensa International uses instant runoff for
the same aim.

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