[Election-Methods] Plurality + Approval + Condorcet.

[Dave Ketchum]

These usually get presented as competitors, with Plurality the villain to
be replaced by Approval, Condorcet, or others.

I suggest they be considered as potentially cooperating.

AND that this could be both practical and profitable.

PLURALITY:  Suitable to MANY voters in MANY elections.  They make a choice
of one of a competing pair, of a leader they will likely help win, or an
expected loser they choose to back for whatever reason.
       They ask, and I believe they should get, ability to express their
preference with little more effort than would be required in Plurality.

APPROVAL:  Suitable when voters see two or more candidates deserving equal
backing as best offered.
       They have same desire as above, and it is as satisfiable, though 
less critical.

CONDORCET:  Offers voters the opportunity for more control via ranking.
Seen as desirable occasionally.  My favorite reason is resolving voting 
for Good vs Soso vs Bad.  I must vote for Good and Soso to defend against 
Bad - but I WANT the election counters to see that I would rather elect 
Good than Soso.  Easy enough with Condorcet.

OTHERS:  Other methods could be included, provided their use can be
recognized without complicating voter or counter tasks for the basics.

CONDORCET DETAILS:
      Truncation:  PERMITTED - necessary to reasonably serve the Plurality
voters.
      Equality:  PERMITTED - necessary to serve Approval voters.
      Writeins:  Can be permitted - just require proper attention to 
counting details.
      Cycles:  Analyzing vote counts to decide on winner when raw counts 
show near ties among three or more.
           Schulze - One of the better methods of resolving cycles, so 
chosen here.
           Winning votes, as in WV vs Margins:  Inspires debate, but I 
back WV.
      Ranking:  Assuming two ranks to be used, it is NOT necessary that 
the symbols used be "1" and "2" - only necessary that vote counters, 
seeing two symbols used by a voter, properly interpret the pair as "=", 
">", or "<" (e.g., 1 2, 5 7, or C N).
      Primaries:  Parties could still desire these to help decide on a 
single candidate to support at general election.  However, there is not 
Plurality's need to avoid splitting votes of party backers - here such can 
vote for all that are backed.
      Runoffs:  These retain little, if any of the positive value they had 
with Plurality - voters can more completely state their desires at general 
election.
      Condorcet arrays:  The N*N counting arrays are worth bragging about, 
as in a tournament.  Precinct and other components are summable for 
district data and data can be published for analysis and other purposes.
      Majority:  Not clear that this is a valuable topic here.  Condorcet 
helps in finding whatever agreement may exist, but cannot prevent 1/3 
going each way as to backing types of pizza, etc.
      True ties:  Always possible, justifying legal equivalent of publicly 
tossing a coin when they occur.
      Strategizing:  Cannot be prevented, but needs discouraging - often 
not possible to tell if a particular voter is part of this.
      IRV:   Uses same ballot as Condorcet, usually agrees as to winner, 
and is hailed by many.  Objectionable because, due to not completely 
accepting all that voters say, it can declare as winners those NOT deserving.

PR (Proportional Repreaentation):  Of interest for legislatures, but not a 
complete replacement for what is proposeed above.
-- 
    davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
    Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
              Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                    If you want peace, work for justice.