[EM] Range voting, zero-info strategy simulation (Dave)

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Oct 31 07:22:56 PST 2006


Hello,

-- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
> Quoting from below:
>  >
>  > These results suggest to me that in the zero-info case, if there are
>  > thought to be more than about 2 other voters, Range should be voted
>  > as in Approval.
>  >
>  > D. Zero-info Approval strategy. The voter gives a 10 to every
> candidate
>  > at least as good as the average value of all candidates, and gives a
>  > 0 to the others.
>  >
> Interpreting, I see, as a common case, a couple tolerable candidates,
> more 
> lemons, at least a few dozen voters - and thus every voter who is playing
> 
> this strategy approving both tolerable candidates without indicating
> which 
> of them is preferred as best.
> 
> I see such strategy as a lemon, and this research as a lemon if it 
> promotes such strategy as it seems to.

I don't understand why you say this, Dave. If for you there are a couple
of tolerable candidates, and a bunch of bad ones, but you have no idea 
which candidates are considered tolerable to the other voters, then it
is indeed your best strategy to give the top score to both of the
candidates you find tolerable. Although you may prefer to indicate a
clear preference of one candidate over another, you must expect that
Range will not reward you for doing so.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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