[EM] Addendum to condorcet method theory

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Antonio,

you wrote (23 Oct 2006):

> In a single-seat election a perfect race would be between two opponents.
> If you vote for one you are definitely voting against the other one and
> the worst of the two will always be eliminated.  In a two-seat election,
> it follows, a perfect election would be between three opponents.  Only
> the worst could be eliminated.  In  a three-seat it would be a four
> opponent race, and etc... etc...
>
> It seems to me that basing a proportional Condorcet method off of this
> observation would allow any of the currently proposed single-winner
> Condorcet methods to be easily extendend into the proportional realm,
> simply be replacing two-way races in a single seat election with
> three-way races in a two-seat election, and electing the two that
> were unbeaten, or only beaten by each other.  Vote-splitting wouldn't
> happen in such circumstances, so an STV-like transfer mechanism would
> be unnecessary.

I believe that my proposal gets close to your idea:

http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze2.pdf
http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze3.zip

Especially, read section 5 of "schulze2.pdf".

Markus Schulze