[EM] Majority Criterion poor standard for elections

[Juho]

On Oct 25, 2006, at 7:07 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> Ultimately, I favor, as many readers know, delegable proxy and  
> methods which work like delegable proxy, like Asset Voting. This  
> should, in fact, have the effect of giving more weight to  
> "knowledgeable voters," but there is a crucial aspect: this is done  
> by free choice of the voters.

I recommend making a clear distinction between "knowledgeable voters  
with more power" and "knowledgeable representatives with more power".  
The latter set gets its power from the voters. The former set gets  
its power maybe from some "knowledgeability tests".

Representatives may be also voters (that elect the representatives)  
but in principle these two roles are separate. (There may also be  
elections where only representatives vote, and even elections where  
both voters and their representatives vote.)

> And methods which ignore strength of preference cannot maximize  
> social utility.

> And if strength of preference is considered, there goes the  
> Majority Criterion....

I at least made a try few mails back on the list with "Ranked  
Preferences". I don't claim that all the criteria are fulfilled but  
some basic cases work. Votes 55: A>B>>C, 45: B>>A>C elect A (the  
majority favourite) although the B supporters strongly disliked her.  
Strong votes however have power in other circumstances since votes  
40: A>>C>B, 40: B>>C>A, 20: C don't elect the Condorcet winner C  
since A and B supporters strongly dislike her. Social utility is  
maybe not yet maximized but maybe improved??

Juho Laatu

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