[EM] 3ballot - revolutionary new protocol for secure secret ballot elections

[Juho]

One small additional trick for the alternative method (described below).

The receipts could have two parts. The voter could tear the parts  
apart and give one of them to some organisation (maybe right after  
stepping out from the voting location) that takes care of checking  
that the election will be honest. The other half the voter would keep  
to herself. The idea is that e.g. in some new emerging democracies  
where one can not trust fully even the organisations and where the  
voters themselves do not have sufficient capability to check their  
votes one could still do the checking in a relatively reliable way.  
The idea is that not even the organisation (that could be a fake one)  
can do any tricks with the receipts (to assist modifying votes, just  
burning the receipts). Failing to report problems could be proven.  
Third check after the government and organisation would still be  
possible if needed.

Juho Laatu


On Oct 15, 2006, at 7:02 , Dave Ketchum wrote:

> On Sat, 14 Oct 2006 12:13:12 +0300 Juho wrote:
>> On Oct 14, 2006, at 5:30 , Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>>>> Is it compatible with Condorcet?  I remain a backer for  
>>>>> Condorcet's
>>>>> combining capability with tolerable complexity.
>>>>
>>>> I think yes, but unfortunately it is more difficult to serve    
>>>> Condorcet than e.g. plurality (one has to trade a bit with   
>>>> complexity  and/or privacy since the Condorcet ballot format is   
>>>> not as easy to  split in separate votes).
>>>
>>> The voter does equivalent of ranking each candidate.  Counter   
>>> counts =/>/< rank between each two candidates 1/3/6/10 pairs for  
>>> 2  to 5 candidates.
>>>      Voter thinking plurality could be recorded as a special case.
>>>      Else best I can see right now is a vote for each > or < pair  
>>> -  a LOT of records if many candidates - but no records for =  
>>> whether  reason is same voter rank or voter ranked neither.
>> This sounds like a good approach if one is ready to accept the   
>> relatively high number of material it produces (in relation to  
>> the  size of the pairwise comparison matrix). The voter can in  
>> principle  check that all her preferences are there (e.g. check  
>> that Y>W row is  there) (there should be only one such row but  
>> maybe she will not  complain if there are two :-) ; no W<Y rows  
>> though). The voter can  check some rows to see that they are  
>> filled correctly (e.g. Q>W, Q>W,  W>Q, assuming that three columns  
>> are used).
>
> Not happy with the volume but UNWILLING to give up on Condorcet,  
> which i consider more important.
>
> Note that many voters will vote the same as for Plurality, for  
> which a special form might be possible.
>
> Even when voting for multiple candidates, many voters should be  
> happy with listing their top couple candidates.
>
> BTW, whether this or other, we DO CARE as to count of Q>W vs Q<W.
>
>>> I stay with Condorcet for letting voters state preferences more   
>>> completely, yet easily, than with Plurality or Approval.  But   
>>> counting such manually AND correctly is a challenge.
>> I'd also like this. If the number of candidates is not too large  
>> it  should work ok. I think the (numerous) ballots should be  
>> machine  readable (which may mean also machine made) to help the  
>> counting  process. Manual checks could be made as well (full  
>> manual counting  would be good as well but maybe not feasible if  
>> the number of  separate ballots gets high).
>
> BOTH machine readable AND manual readable is proper.
>
> BUT, assuming proper attention to having TRUE voting machines,  
> bothering with the pain of manual reading should be rare.
>>>>> Given a TRUE voting machine, why add 3ballot?  ZERO value in   
>>>>> this  effort.
>>>>
>>>> I think ThreeBallot does good job in defending against foul  
>>>> play  in  the vote counting process. I don't know what you  
>>>> exactly mean  with a  TRUE voting machine but maybe any kind of  
>>>> machines could  be improved.  The voting machines could be  
>>>> thoroughly and  neutrally tested and  sealed and be based on  
>>>> open source code. If  they collect all the  results in  
>>>> electronic format they could be  connected to Internet and   
>>>> memory sticks immediately after the  voting ends and results  
>>>> would be  public after that. Hard drives  and/or memory could be  
>>>> destroyed if  needed. Paper trail is still  possible also in the  
>>>> machine based  scenarios.
>>>
>>> I question whether 3ballot helps the counting process,  It   
>>> complicates counting, making more room for those inclined to do  
>>> evil.
>> It complicates the process, and using Condorcet still adds some  
>> more  complexity, but of course there is also the other side,  
>> possibility  to check that some individual votes were not deleted,  
>> modified or added.
>
> Using Condorcet lets voters more completely state their thoughts.
>
> Agreed we need to prevent "deleted, modified or added" - the  
> question is how to accomplish that.
>>> I am against destroying any kind of memory:
>>>      There should be nothing there that needs privacy.
>>>      Could be data evil ones wish destroyed.
>> I agree that in principle everything should be open. The risks  
>> that I  was considering were like having the votes stored on the  
>> hard disk in  the order of voting (logically or physically), which  
>> might reveal  something.
>
> I would DEMAND that the record being prepared for hard disk have  
> the ballots in true random order (sometimes those needing a random  
> sequence of numbers use a formula that would give the same results  
> tomorrow as it did today),
>      Thinking, without studying, could the space used for  
> accumulating data for records for this hard disk be such that no  
> data would be lost even with expectable power failures?
>
> DWK
>>>> Some more words about the complexity of the method. I'll give  
>>>> one   example of an alternative and simpler method. How do you  
>>>> evaluate  the  usability/complexity of this method?
>>>> - the voting machine puts one copy of each ballot in one basket   
>>>> and  several receipt copies of it in another basket
>>>>      - we may have several ballots per voter if we use   
>>>> ThreeBallot  style ballots (receipt copies could be made of all  
>>>> of  them)
>>>>      - or alternatively only one if that is secure enough  
>>>> (could  suit  your needs)
>>>>      - it is also possible that the voter gives only her  
>>>> opinion  to  the machine and the machine then generates more  
>>>> complex ballots
>>>>        (three or maybe broken into separate "rows")
>>>>        (also Condorcet based votes could be split this way)
>>>> - the voting machine has no memory
>>>> - the first basket contains the results of the election
>>>> - the second basket is used for distributing receipts
>>>> - the receipts will be distributed to interested people,  
>>>> limited   number of random receipts to each of them
>>>>      - there are several copies of the receipts and limitations   
>>>> in  the distribution to defend against receipt holders using  
>>>> them   maliciously
>>>> - the distribution may start right after the election is  
>>>> closed,  or  when the basket contains many enough ballots to  
>>>> protect privacy
>>>> At least in basic plurality voting this method may be   
>>>> considerably  simpler than the one that Rivest described  
>>>> (numbers  based ballots  with negative votes, as discussed by  
>>>> Warren Smith  and Michael Rouse  on this list).
>>>> Distributing personal receipts is also possible but maybe not  
>>>> done  if  simplicity is what we seek.
>>>> I assumed that the machine had no memory. If it had, I'd   
>>>> recommend  full publicity of the right after the voting closes.
>>>> Any chances of making the "receipt style" methods simple enough   
>>>> for you?
>>>
>>>
>>> Would take a lot of thought as to how they offer value without   
>>> destroying privacy, and do something good about evil doers.
>> Not asking for a complete analysis but if you find weaknesses  
>> please  let me know.
>> Juho Laatu
>>                 
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>
> -- 
>  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
>  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
>            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
>                  If you want peace, work for justice.
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