[EM] Competitive Districting Rule - SPPA

[Stephane Rouillon]

Hello EM List,

I have been rather busy with electoral reform in Quebec, but I finally
found the time
to answer some mails I kept since summer.

I made an identical analysis to Mr. Olson's point of view, that leaded
me to a bicameral scheme too:
one geographic representation for demanders and one ideological
representation for decidors.
With the actual system, politicians who judge when some group of people
ask for subventions or special treatment, can benefit directly from the
decisions by a short electoral feedback. Local interest overcomes global
interest.

To avoid this situation the separation of deciders and defendors is
fundamental, exactly like there are
attorneys and judge in the legislative field. I suggest STV for the
election of local representatives (municipal level)
and SPPA for the national representatives.
SPPA is the french acronym for a Preferential, Proportional and
Acirconscriptive (without district) system.
A crutch option garantees stability, respecting a generalized version of
proportionality using the time (mandate length) as an additional
dimension to realize both these incompatible objectives.
The results respects the check and balance principle.

SPPA is described in french at:
http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fra/37legislature2/commissions/Csle/depot-CSLE-CG.html

Click on 1MA to download.
I can provide an english version on demand.

Stéphane Rouillon

Brian Olson a écrit :

> What's a district for? Districts achieve geographic representation on
> the theory that some region of people will share some concerns, or
> simply on the practical matter that it's administratively convenient
> and efficient to divvy up representatives that way. Districts have
> sometimes been contorted to make sure that some minority (blacks and
> latinos, from what I've heard of The South and Texas) gets a
> representative. I think the correct solution to this desire to achieve
> ideological or identity representation through some proportional
> representation scheme such as STV, or through an instant proxy or
> asset voting legislative setup. I'm opposed to favoring "competitive
> districts" because that is anti-democratic. What's the point of
> distorting a district to achieve a likely 50/50 split between the top
> two vote getters? General anti-incumbency? I think this assumes the
> current two-party, one vote system. We all know that there are better,
> more representative ways to elect a single winner. Any of our current
> 60/40 "safe" districts could potentially be blown wide open with a
> IRR/VRR/Condorcet election and a candidate who broke out from the
> squeeze between the 60% and the 40%, taking the some combination
> resulting in 65%. With a better ballot, there are no "safe" seats
> because you can vote the bum out safely by ranking an alternative
> higher, with the mediocre incumbent in 2nd or 3rd. Measuring driving
> time distance would be awesome. It would effectively have real
> sociological knowledge built in, and there would be less chance for
> someone to muck with trying to break districts along certain lines by
> inventing barriers. However, that's much more complicated mapping than
> I'm willing to implement right now so straight line distance it is.  I
> still think I want a bicameral legislature with one districted body
> and one PR/proxy/asset body.
>  Brian Olsonhttp://bolson.org/
>
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