[EM] Giving different voting weights to different people

[raphfrk at netscape.net]

 From: abd at lomaxdesign.com
 > >For example, one of the problems with a world democratic government 
 > >is that it will transfer 
 > >power to countries (or at least their citizens) which are not 
 > >currently very powerful. This 
 > >means that powerful countries will resist any such change (and 
 > >rightly so). The minimum that 
 > >would occur is that they would pay higher taxes and those taxes 
 > >would be spent on the poorer 
 > >countries. Even worse would include forced social changes which are 
 > >designed to reduce their 
 > >power. 
 > 
 > This is a very old problem. The states of the United States differed 
 > in power and population. The weirdness of the U.S. electoral college and 
 > the U.S. Senate are a direct offspring of the compromise that was made. 
 
 Right, that was why I included suggestions that would keep the power
 measure aligned to "reality". Also, there is a physiological problem which
 is that people won't give up something they feel they own even if it is
 no longer worth it.
 
 A country which was great and isn't any more isn't going to give up a 
 permanent seat on the security council, even if it is costing it money.
 
 This is a separate question from the persistence of power imbalance that 
 you mention. It is not unreasonable that a powerful country should have
 more power in any institutions. This is just recognizing reality.
 
 However, a rule which discriminates against certain people no matter what, 
 is a problem. For example, Germany is at least as powerful as France and yet
 it doesn't get a permenent seat due to actions that occurred 50+ years ago.
 Similarly, Japan is powerful and doesn't get a seat.
 
 The security council crystalised the power structure at the end of WW2.
 
 > >However, if a mechanism could be created that would maintain the 
 > >current power balance, 
 > >maybe there would be less resistance. 
 > 
 > Now, the problem with this is that it can institutionalize the power 
 > *imbalance.* The electoral anomaly of the U.S. Presidential election in 
 > 2000, an event which arguably had world-shinking consequences, was made 
 > possible courtesy of the compromise which was made over 200 years ago. 
 
 By maintain the current power balance, I meant not change it both initially 
 and into the future. The "current power balance" includes the fact that 
 some powerful countries are going to be less powerful in years to come 
 and others will become more powerful. A rule which gives a list of 
 countries and their vote "crystalised" for all time, is arguably a change to
 the power balance. Countries which are likely to lose power over the 
 new few decades would support it, but rising countries wouldn't.
 
 If a system could be agreed which tracks the rises/falls, then it
 maintains the current balance of power into the future.
 
 
 > > I am not actually an advocate of a world government, 
 > >but I think this topic can be handled better in that context than >applying it to government at 
 > >the country level as most residents in a country are reasonably >similar in power (with a small 
 > >number with high power). 
 > 
 > Having little time at the moment, I'll just point out that when a system 
 > seeks consensus, power differentials become far less important. And failure 
 > to seek consensus keeps a society relatively weak. (Not necessarily weak in 
 > absolute terms, but compared to what it would be where social decisions are 
 > not being imposed by an oligarchy or the dictatorship of the majority.) 
 
 Right, however, there comes a point where consensus cannot be used. There 
 has to be a fall back option. This fall back option is the stick that gets
 people to the table, so that the carrot of consensus can be achieved.
 
 
 > Suppose ....
 << Caucus A and B work together instead of wasting their efforts by
 canceling each other out >>
 
 I agree that voluntary agreements can make any system better. However, there
 needs to be a fall back option of what happens if no agreement happens.
 
 > However, if nearly everyone gets behind Option 4, the situation is 
 > drastically different. If the organization represents nearly everyone, 
 > *they don't need to spend at all, they only need to vote.* 
 
 Right, but they only agreed to option 4 because the alternatives were
 less appealing. 
 
 In theory, you could say that no bill gets passed without 90% of both Houses.
 This would obviously mean consensus is needed, but places a huge weight
 to maintain the status quo.
 
 Arguably, another way of looking at voting is that it is a quick way to 
 figure out what way a civil war would go without actually fighting it.
 
 > *Communication* is the key to political reform. FA/DP is a device for 
 > making *deliberation* possible on a large scale. The FA aspect of the 
 > design strongly favors the seeking of consensus, but it does not require 
 > it. No caucus is prevented from acting at any point. FAs are not governments
 > and governments are not FAs, by definition. From the model FA Traditions,
 > those of Alcoholics Anonymous, "Our leaders are but trusted servants, 
 > they do not govern." 
 
 Right, however, as you say yourself, the trick to getting a system like
 this to work is exactly that they don't be given any power. This means that
 there needs to be a way to assign power. If consensus is reached, then
 it doesn't matter (much) what form that takes. However, it is the default
 option for when consensus is not reached.
 
    Raphfrk
 --------------------
 Interesting site
 "what if anyone could modify the laws"
 
 www.wikocracy.com  
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