<HTML><BODY>
<div>From: abd@lomaxdesign.com<br>
> >For example, one of the problems with a world democratic government <br>
> >is that it will transfer <br>
> >power to countries (or at least their citizens) which are not <br>
> >currently very powerful. This <br>
> >means that powerful countries will resist any such change (and <br>
> >rightly so). The minimum that <br>
> >would occur is that they would pay higher taxes and those taxes <br>
> >would be spent on the poorer <br>
> >countries. Even worse would include forced social changes which are <br>
> >designed to reduce their <br>
> >power. <br>
> <br>
> This is a very old problem. The states of the United States differed <br>
> in power and population. The weirdness of the U.S. electoral college and <br>
> the U.S. Senate are a direct offspring of the compromise that was made. <br>
<br>
Right, that was why I included suggestions that would keep the power<br>
measure aligned to "reality". Also, there is a <span class="correction" id="">physiological</span> problem which<br>
is that people won't give up something they feel they own even if it is<br>
no longer worth it.<br>
<br>
A country which was great and isn't any more isn't going to give up a <br>
<span class="correction" id="">permanent</span> seat on the security council, even if it is costing it money.<br>
<br>
This is a separate question from the <span class="correction" id="">persistence</span> of power imbalance that <br>
you mention. It is not unreasonable that a powerful country should have<br>
more power in any institutions. This is just <span class="correction" id="">recognizing</span> reality.<br>
<br>
However, a rule which discriminates against certain people no matter what, <br>
is a problem. For example, Germany is at least as powerful as France and yet<br>
it doesn't get a <span class="correction" id="">permenent</span> seat due to actions that <span class="correction" id="">occurred</span> 50+ years ago.<br>
<span class="correction" id="">Similarly</span>, Japan is powerful and doesn't get a seat.<br>
<br>
The security council <span class="correction" id="">crystalised</span> the power structure at the end of <span class="correction" id="">WW2</span>.<br>
<br>
> >However, if a mechanism could be created that would maintain the <br>
> >current power balance, <br>
> >maybe there would be less resistance. <br>
> <br>
> Now, the problem with this is that it can institutionalize the power <br>
> *imbalance.* The electoral anomaly of the U.S. Presidential election in <br>
> 2000, an event which arguably had <span class="correction" id="">world-shinking</span> consequences, was made <br>
> possible courtesy of the compromise which was made over 200 years ago. <br>
<br>
By maintain the current power balance, I meant not change it both initially <br>
and into the future. The "current power balance" includes the fact that <br>
some powerful countries are going to be less powerful in years to come <br>
and others will become more powerful. A rule which gives a list of <br>
countries and their vote "<span class="correction" id="">crystalised</span>" for all time, is arguably a change to<br>
the power balance. Countries which are likely to lose power over the <br>
new few decades would support it, but rising countries wouldn't.<br>
<br>
If a system could be agreed which tracks the rises/falls, then it<br>
maintains the current balance of power into the future.<br>
<br>
<br>
> > I am not actually an advocate of a world government, <br>
> >but I think this topic can be handled better in that context than >applying it to government at <br>
> >the country level as most residents in a country are reasonably >similar in power (with a small <br>
> >number with high power). <br>
> <br>
> Having little time at the moment, I'll just point out that when a system <br>
> seeks consensus, power differentials become far less important. And failure <br>
> to seek consensus keeps a society relatively weak. (Not necessarily weak in <br>
> absolute terms, but compared to what it would be where social decisions are <br>
> not being imposed by an oligarchy or the dictatorship of the majority.) <br>
<br>
Right, however, there comes a point where <span class="correction" id="">consensus</span> cannot be used. There <br>
has to be a fall back option. This fall back option is the stick that gets<br>
people to the table, so that the carrot of <span class="correction" id="">consensus</span> can be achieved.<br>
<br>
<br>
> Suppose ....<br>
<< <span class="correction" id="">Caucus</span> A and B work together instead of wasting their efforts by<br>
canceling each other out >><br>
<br>
I agree that voluntary agreements can make any system better. However, there<br>
needs to be a fall back option of what happens if no agreement happens.<br>
<br>
> However, if nearly everyone gets behind Option 4, the situation is <br>
> drastically different. If the organization represents nearly everyone, <br>
> *they don't need to spend at all, they only need to vote.* <br>
<br>
Right, but they only agreed to option 4 because the alternatives were<br>
less appealing. <br>
<br>
In theory, you could say that no bill gets passed without 90% of both Houses.<br>
This would obviously mean consensus is needed, but places a huge weight<br>
to maintain the status quo.<br>
<br>
Arguably, another way of looking at voting is that it is a quick way to <br>
figure out what way a civil war would go without actually fighting it.<br>
<br>
> *Communication* is the key to political reform. <span class="correction" id="">FA</span>/<span class="correction" id="">DP</span> is a device for <br>
> making *deliberation* possible on a large scale. The <span class="correction" id="">FA</span> aspect of the <br>
> design strongly favors the seeking of consensus, but it does not require <br>
> it. No caucus is prevented from acting at any point. <span class="correction" id="">FAs</span> are not governments<br>
> and governments are not <span class="correction" id="">FAs</span>, by definition. From the model <span class="correction" id="">FA</span> Traditions,<br>
> those of Alcoholics Anonymous, "Our leaders are but trusted servants, <br>
> they do not govern." <br>
<br>
Right, however, as you say yourself, the trick to getting a system like<br>
this to work is exactly that they don't be given any power. This means that<br>
there needs to be a way to assign power. If consensus is reached, then<br>
it doesn't matter (much) what form that takes. However, it is the default<br>
option for when consensus is not reached.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div style="clear: both;"><span class="correction" id="">Raphfrk</span><br>
--------------------<br>
Interesting site<br>
"what if anyone could modify the laws"<br>
<br>
<span class="correction" id="">www</span>.<span class="correction" id="">wikocracy</span>.com</div>
<!-- end of AOLMsgPart_0_3000de0e-8bec-4ec6-bf15-08b9f7d7dcb2 -->
<div class="AOLPromoFooter">
<hr style="margin-top:10px;" />
<a href="http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100122638x1081283466x1074645346/aol?redir=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Eaim%2Ecom%2Ffun%2Fmail%2F" target="_blank"><b>Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail</b></a> -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.<br />
</div>
</BODY></HTML>