# [EM] Range Voting Strategy

Juho juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Sat Nov 11 22:36:42 PST 2006

```Some more proposals:

1) In E the average value was used to make the division to max and
min. Also 50% of the candidates getting max and 50% min could be one
strategy.

2) I understood that all voters always had the same strategy. It
would be good to test also cases where one voter or a group of voters
has different strategy than others.

3) Continuing from Chris' scenario. Expand the biggest gap so much
that the best candidate gets max and the worst candidate gets min.

4) Continuing further. Take scaled sincerity and one of the "min and
max only" strategies and study (with different number of candidates
and voters) intermediate strategies where the values are pushed to
the extreme ends only partially.

5) When the number of candidates and voters increases the best
strategy seems to evolve B, H, J,... and ending up in E (or some
other quite similar strategy). Once open question 2 (of http://
rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html) is (roughly) solved the next step
could be to take some (Range style, semi-reliable) opinion poll
results and cook up the correct strategy for that situation. One easy
approximation (that can be simulated) to knowing the opinions semi-
reliably would be to know certain number of votes for sure and
assuming the rest to be zero-info.

Juho Laatu

On Nov 9, 2006, at 20:04 , Chris Benham wrote:

>
> Warren Smith wrote:
>
>> Kevin Venzke posted some news about range voting strategy.
>> I have now written considerably more extensive simulator than his
>> (but inspired by his) and the results are interesting.
>>    Somewhat contrary to what Venzke seemed to be concluding,
>> my conclusion is that "honest" range voting (scaled
>> so you score the best candiate the max, the worst the min,
>> and the rest linearly interpolated)  is an impressively
>> good voting strategy in the random voter zero info statistical
>> setting.
>>   http://rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html
>>
>> wds
>> ----
>>
>>
>>
>> C. Scaled sincerity. Voter linearly transforms utilities to make best
>> have rescaled utility 1,
>> worst 0, and rest linearly interpolated, then uses that as her vote
>>
>> E  Mean-based thresholding. The voter gives max to every candidate at
>> least as good as
>> the average value of all candidates, and gives min to the others
>
>
>
> This doesn't surprise me very much. How does the number of slots on
> the
> ratings ballot
> (the granularity of the Range ballot) affect this? Since E is the best
> strategy with more than
> about 10 voters, and with Approval these two strategies are the same,
> does that mean that
> from this point of view the fewer the better?  Then is Half-Approval
> (Range 3) better in this
> respect than Range 100?
>
> One slightly interesting approval strategy you didn't list:
> "approve all
> candidates preferred to
> all the candidates below the biggest sincere ratings gap between
> any two
> consecutively ranked
> candidates".  I think it takes more than three candidates for this to
> differ from E.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
> ----
> election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
> list info

___________________________________________________________
Inbox full of spam? Get leading spam protection and 1GB storage with All New Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html

```