[EM] Voting by selecting a published ordering

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 10:38 PM 5/12/2006, Simmons, Forest wrote:

>So most of the time, in the context of Candidate Published 
>Orderings, Concorcet will yield an unambiguous social ordering of 
>the candidates, with no cycles to resolve.
>
>More importantly (and precisely) it means that if the four 
>candidates accurately judge their relative closeness to each other 
>(and vote sincerely) then there is only one chance in 240 that there 
>will not be a Condorcet Winner.
>
>Why 1/240 instead of 1/30?  Because, as I mentioned in my previous 
>message, even in the one case where there is not always a Condorcet 
>Winner, only one eighth of the distributions of the voters among the 
>four factions will result in a cycle.
>
>I would say that's amazing, and extremely relevant to the topic of 
>this thread.

Yes, fascinating. Published ordering is related to proxy methods 
which reduce the number of voters without reducing the number of 
votes. Standard Proxy and Delegable Proxy can be used in deliberative 
process,  Asset Voting is a hybrid election method/deliberative 
process, and Candidate Published Ordering, suitably used, is an 
election method that takes advantage of the reduced number of 
effective voters, while remaining close to traditional election process.

I'd claim that all of these methods are likely to produce more 
satisfactory results than relying purely on direct votes from the 
ordinary voter, due to the likelihood that the effective voters 
(called "Candidates") are more informed. They have the advantages of 
representative methods -- the operating foundation of modern 
democracy in all except a few small contexts -- with the freedom and 
flexibility of direct democracy. (Because, in theory at least, and, I 
predict, in practice, the choice of who will carry your vote forward 
is a free one; if you don't like any possible choice, run yourself.)

Used Multiwinner, it becomes possible to approach No Wasted Votes. 
Even single-winner, no votes are wasted in the sense that  no vote is 
excluded from the final pairwise contest.

I'd prefer the flexibility of Asset Voting to the fixed process of 
Candidate Published Ordering, for the latter could still create a 
minority winner, unless the rules prohibited that. Asset would avoid 
a second poll, unless the candidates holding the votes absolutely 
refused to compromise. In which case the society has some very 
serious problems that should be directly addressed instead of trying 
to ram through an election result.....

But, of course, I'm working on Delegable Proxy for NGOs, which could 
ultimately make sophisticated elections methods almost redundant. You 
don't need a sophisticated election method to derive a result from a 
general consensus, developed deliberatively outside formal 
governmental process.

http://metaparty.beyondpolitics.org is the latest project, the first 
one that I did not personally start.