[EM] STV-CLE

James Green-Armytage jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Sat May 6 15:25:49 PDT 2006


Dan,

	The CLE-STV idea is not consistent with the basic spirit of proportional
representation. 
A simple example:

3 seats to be filled, 100 voters, Newland-Britton quota is 25.
50: A>B>C>D>E
16: C>E>D>A>B
14: D>E>C>A>B
20: E>C>D>A>B

	STV and CPO-STV choose {A, B, E}, but CLE-STV eliminates E and chooses
{A, B, C}. The problem with CLE-STV is that even though the 50 A>B>C>D>E
voters have their votes fully invested in the quotas of A and B, they are
still having an influence on which candidate is eliminated.
	CLE-STV is an uncomfortable marriage of proportional representation and
majority rule. If you want a proportional method that combines the
Condorcet and STV principles more happily, I recommend CPO-STV.

my best,
James

P.S. I define CPO-STV and the Newland-Britton quota at 
http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/vm/survey.htm


Dan Bishop <daniel-j-bishop at neo.tamu.edu> writes:
>I've made passing mention of my STV-CLE method (the CLE stands for 
>Condorcet Loser Elimination) a couple of times, but the recent 
>"Proportional Condorcet Voting" thread encouraged me to finally give it 
>a decent introduction.
>
>Essentially, STV-CLE is just like STV, except that instead of 
>eliminating the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes, you 
>eliminate the Condorcet (completion) loser.  




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