[EM] possible improved IRV method
eric at ericgorr.net
eric at ericgorr.net
Fri Jun 30 07:48:20 PDT 2006
Quoting Eric Gorr <eric at ericgorr.net>:
> Allen Pulsifer wrote:
>> Going back to the example I gave, the Condorcet majority that elected D was
>> made up of everyone who did not rank A the highest, i.e., the Not A's, and
>> they all coalesced around D. In reality a coalition like that would never
>> happen and if it did, it could not be held together. In fact, in the
>> example I gave, the only thing that allowed D in the party was the A voters:
>> If only a small portion of those voters realized that their strongest
>> head-to-head competitor was Candidate D, and then proceeded to downgrade him
>> to last place, then under any system D would be shut out and A would win.
>> That is what would happen in reality, and IMHO, in order to have healthy
>> governance, that is what should happen.
> This is a wonderful example of the fundamental flaw with this class of
> argument that I mentioned before.
> Why assume that only the A voters would attempt to manipulate the
> election by changing their votes?
> If the B & C voters, who certainly prefer D over A, get a hint that the
> A voters are attempting to manipulate the election, they can bury A and
> promote D and give D the victory - 500 to 499, which was the sincere
> outcome to begin with.
Of course, if things go really wrong, the A voters could end up giving
the victory way to candidate C or B. For example, if the A voters all
bury D and then B&C voters would see this promotion as an opportunity
to win by burying A. Then, if the D voters, knowing they can no longer
win and being rather upset with the dishonesty of the A voters, also
bury A, you can end up with something like:
Granting C the victory as the new Condorcet Winner.
Which, of course, brings me back to another point I made earlier that
when people start to vote strategically, the potential for _anyone_ to
win in such close elections increases dramatically...which, again, is
leading me to a currently unprovable conclusion that a good Condorcet
Method encourages sincere voting.
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