[EM] possible improved IRV method

Eric Gorr eric at ericgorr.net
Thu Jun 29 20:15:28 PDT 2006

Allen Pulsifer wrote:
> Going back to the example I gave, the Condorcet majority that elected D was
> made up of everyone who did not rank A the highest, i.e., the Not A's, and
> they all coalesced around D.  In reality a coalition like that would never
> happen and if it did, it could not be held together.  In fact, in the
> example I gave, the only thing that allowed D in the party was the A voters:
> 166:A>B>D>C
> 166:A>C>D>B
>  83:A>D>B>C
>  83:A>D>C>B
>   etc.
> If only a small portion of those voters realized that their strongest
> head-to-head competitor was Candidate D, and then proceeded to downgrade him
> to last place, then under any system D would be shut out and A would win.
> That is what would happen in reality, and IMHO, in order to have healthy
> governance, that is what should happen.

This is a wonderful example of the fundamental flaw with this class of 
argument that I mentioned before.

Why assume that only the A voters would attempt to manipulate the 
election by changing their votes?

If the B & C voters, who certainly prefer D over A, get a hint that the 
A voters are attempting to manipulate the election, they can bury A and 
promote D and give D the victory - 500 to 499, which was the sincere 
outcome to begin with.

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