[EM] IRV vs Condorcet - a challenge

[Dave Ketchum]

On Mon, 12 Jun 2006 23:36:45 -0500 Dan Bishop wrote:

> Dave Ketchum wrote:
> 
>>      Permitting equal ranking for multiple candidates.  Desirable for 
>>pleasing those who call Approval desirable; doable with Condorcet, though 
>>there can be arguments as to counting' Not doable as practical for IRV 
>>(explain how if you disagree).
>>
> 
> Some simple ways of dealing with equal rankings in IRV/STV are:
> 
> (1) "Transferrable Cumulative Vote" - If there are N top-ranked 
> non-eliminated candidates on a ballot, then each candidate receives 1/N 
> of a vote.  (This is what I used in my STV-CLE calculator.)


Looks fair - weakens the best liked candidate while giving the others extra.

> 
> (2) "Transferrable Approval Vote" - Each top-ranked non-eliminated 
> candidate on a ballot receives 1 vote.


NOT fair - gives each such candidate an extra boost.

> 
> (3) Convert every ballot into a fully-ranked one by breaking ties at random.


Looks fair.

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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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