[EM] An example of BTR-STV

Anthony O'Neal thasupasacfitinman at gmail.com
Thu Jun 8 18:29:31 PDT 2006

```Anthony O'Neal wrote:
> STV elects Andrea, Carter, and Deliliah.  CPO-STV elects Andrea,
> Carter, and Scott.
>
> Now let's compute the score for BTR-STV:

>>I should point out that I proposed BTR-IRV as a slightly hacked IRV
>>that
>>would never eliminate a Condorcet winner, in the hope that IRV
>>supporters
>>might be more likely to support it than Approval or a more direct
>>Condorcet method.  I meant it only as a single-winner method and I
>>don't
>>recommend that it be generalized for the multiwinner case.  For
>>example,
>>
>>45:A>B>C
>>20:B>C>A
>>35:C>B>A
>>
>>and two winners are to be elected, I think {A, C} is a better winner
>>set
>>than {A, B} even though B is the Condorcet winner.
>>
>>(I didn't suggest a name for the method when I proposed it, but it has
>>been called the "orphan" method, LeGrand IRV and BTR-IRV.)

You example is bad.  A and C would get elected because they both
exceed the droop quota.

However, you are completely confusing my method. It does not take the bottom
two and have each voter vote for the one they ranked highest.
It takes the bottome N + 1 (where N is the number of seats that need to be
filled in the STV election, which may change over how many winners have been
declared elected in the STV election) and compares each voter votes for the
one whom they ranked highest.  This is actually the same as the single
winner version you proposed, wich still takes N + 1, which is, of course,
two in a single winner election.  It is three in a two winner election, four
in a three winner election, and so on.  Do you see now?
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