[EM] multi-method combo

Jonathan Lundell jlundell at pobox.com
Thu Jun 8 08:35:17 PDT 2006


At 1:57 AM -0400 6/8/06, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>If I understand complaints about troublemaking, Tom and his friends,
>SOMEHOW knowing how all others will vote, vote a pattern that will change
>the winner, without directly voting their desire.
>       How do they manage this without Dick ad HIS friends finding out and
>doing a counter plot.
>       ANYWAY, how did these troublemakers get a valid picture as to what
>all other voters were doing? "what they think other voters are going to
>do" is not sufficient for successful troublemaking.

To take a real-world recent example, on Tuesday we had a 
gubernatorial primary election in California to choose party 
candidates for the November general election. In the Democratic 
primary, there were half a dozen candidates, but only two with a 
chance of winning, and extensive polling leading up to the primary 
had them in a statistical tie. That's not an uncommon situation, and 
the Condorcet strategy of burying would have been trivial to 
implement.

With IRV, I'd be interested in knowing what the strategy would be in 
the above election.

-- 
/Jonathan Lundell.



More information about the Election-Methods mailing list