[EM] Another Lottery Method

Simmons, Forest simmonfo at up.edu
Tue Jul 18 17:23:06 PDT 2006


This method is based on rankings with truncations and approval cutoffs.
 
Let  X  be the candidate approved on the greatest number of ballots.  Let Y be the candidate ranked on the greatest number of ballots.
 
If  X and Y are the same candidate, then this candidate wins.
 
Otherwise, a ballot is drawn at random.  If this ballot distinguishes these two candidates, then this ballot determines which of the two wins.
 
Otherwise, the candidate Z ranked highest on the ballot gets to say which member of the set {X,Y} is the winner
 
The rationale for the last "otherwise" is that a voter that was not interested in distinguishing X and Y would probably trust her favorite candidate to make that distinction for her., and if she did feel strongly that one was better than the other, then she would probably want to rank at least one of them.
 
Note that the contest is between the least truncated candidate and the most approved candidate, two candidates that should both be broadly tolerated  by the voters in comparison with the other candidates.
 
It seems to me that this method removes almost all incentive for insincere order reversal, and most incentive for order collapse (except for the collapse inherent in truncation).
 
To simplify things, voters that do not wish to rank candidates should have the option of merely specifying  which candidate is their favorite, which other candidates they approve, and which of the rest they would not truncate.  This would give them as much power as anybody else in determining candidates X and Y.
 
A ballot that specified only these four levels would still have a decent chance of distinguishing X and Y, as well, but if not, then the choice of the ballot favorite Z would probably be satisfactory in the eyes of the ballot's voter.
 
Comments?
 
Forest
 
 
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