# [EM] Scott Ritchie's FAVS criterion - uniquely favors range voting

Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu
Sat Dec 16 09:33:50 PST 2006

```Yes to Chris Benham; I independently came up with a very similar IRV FAVS-violation example
and posted it on
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RangeVoting/message/2716
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RangeVoting/message/2708

To Scott Ritchie, yes, I just invented the name FAVS and IFAVS (incomplete info version).

Perhaps FAVA is better name than FAVS.

N.Tideman told me, however, that he does not consider FAVS-satisfaction necessarily to
be a good thing.  In fact, he thinks it is probably a bad thing.

Anyway, CONTINUUM range voting (which is what I generally mean when
I say "range voting" in a mathematical context) satisfies IFAVS but
IRV and Borda fail FAVS and fail IFAVS; approval and plurality satisfy FAVS
but fail IFAVS.

I do not know of any method other than range voting that satisfies IFAVS, but
wouldn't be surprised if some other continuum voting method also would.
Oho: L2-ball voting will too.  (Your vote in N-candidate election is a real N-vector
with sum of squares <=1.)
So will cumulative (ditto, but each entry is >=0 and sum of entries is <=1).
Both L2-ball and cumulative voting are stupid voting systems however because
best strategy is always to plurality vote in a complete-info situation anyhow, as
well as all the most common incomplete-info situations, for cumulative,
and for L2 you vote (+1, -1, 0,0,...,0) / sqrt(2)   for the two frontrunners.
Reducing to vote-for-and-against.

wds
http://rangevoting.org

```