# [EM] Is there a criterion for identical voters casting identical ballots?

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Fri Dec 15 05:02:39 PST 2006

```How did we get here?

I assume no ties to simplify the discussion - not to change the rules.

If there is a cycle, such as X>A>Y>X, A backers have no control as to X>A,
but they can influence whether there is also a Y>X to create a cycle.

Else, assuming more voters back X than A, A loses and it matters not what
ordering A backers choose for others.

If there is no such X, A wins and it matters not how A backers sort those
losing to A.

LOOKING CLOSER - If A backers want to be neutral as to B/C/D, they can
simply vote for A as they would in Plurality.

On Fri, 15 Dec 2006 00:01:04 +0200 Juho wrote:

> Here is one very basic case where a group of voters has identical
> preferences but they benefit of casting three different kind of ballots.
>
> In a Condorcet method there is an interest to create a loop to your
> opponents. In its simplest form there are four candidates. One of the
> candidates is our favourite and the others we want to beat. The
> others may or may not be from one party (this influences the
> probability of being able to generate a cycle at least if there are
> more than 4 candidates). Let's anyway assume that all the candidates
> will get about the same number of votes. Also in a zero info
> situation this may be a good voting strategy. The A supporters vote
> according to three patterns as follows.
>
> A>B>C>D
> A>C>D>B
> A>D>B>C
>
> If all candidates have same number of first place supporters (and
> other preferences are mixed) and B, C and D supporters don't try to
> create loops, A wins.
>
> Juho Laatu

--
davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.

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