[EM] Simulation of political identity space in voting

[raphfrk at netscape.net]

 From: bql at bolson.org
 > Ka-Ping Ye did some excellent work
 >
 > The original is here, and was discussed on this list many months ago:
 > http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/
 
 Yeah, it's cool.
 
 > Mostly I've independently verified the results, but I've added my
 > favorite pet method, Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings (IRNR) into
 > the mix.
 
 When you say you average results, does that mean you mix the colour ?
 
 How do your voters vote ?
 
 I assume it is something like:
 
 Utility = 1/distance ?
 
 Max Social Utility: pick candidate with highest utilty
 
 Pick One: Pick nearest 
 
 IRV: Pick in order of distance
 
 IRNR: Pick in order of distance (do you have link to count rules?)
 
 Condorcet: Pick in order of distance
 
 Rating Summation: Rating = utility ? (Range)
 Are votes capped, if not then won't that give same as max utility ?
 
 Borda: Pick in order of distance
 
 > This method is great because it makes behaviors of the election
 > method readily apparent visually. I used to claim that IRNR would be
 > free of IRV's oddities because IRNR considered the whole ballot and
 > used continuous ratings. Someone here cleverly found a counter case,
 > but graphically it jumps out of the picture that IRNR does have
 > irregularities. On the plus side, they're much smaller than IRV's
 > problems. :-)
 
 What would be cool would be if you re-ran the sims with strategic voting.
 
 Plurality -- run poll and then everyone votes for one of the top 2 in
 the poll. I am not sure this is accurate though.
 
 What about
 2 candidates are selected as the favourites (same 2 for entire run)
 
 Take a poll
 Pick favourite of the top 2 unless,
 the utility of both the top 2 is less than X, then pick favourite
 
 In election
 Vote for your favourite of the top 2 candidates in the poll
 
 This models the benefit of being one of the main party nominees.
 
 Another option is to keep rerunning the election until the winner
 is stable ... but that might be cyclic.
 
 IRV -- run poll and rank favourite of top 2 first and least favourite of
 top 2 last, rest honest. Not sure if that is actually what is strategic
 
 IRNR: Not sure
 
 Condorcet:
 
 Range/Rating Summation:
 - Rate favorite at max and least favourite at win and linear interpolate rest
 - Use approval strategy (give max to favorite of top 2 and min to other of top 2)
 
 Borda:
 
 > I understand that most of you aren't computer scientists and quick to
 > program up new tests, but I'm excited about this testing right now
 > and if you'll just implement your favorite election method in _some_
 > language, C, C++, java, javascript, perl, python, heck I'll even
 > accept PHP, LISP or FORTRAN, I'll translate it and fit it into the
 > test harness.
 >
 
 There aren't probably that many functions.
 
 You need 1 that converts a candidate/utility list to a vote and 1
 that converts a list of votes into a result.
 
 This allows people to code voting strategies (by changing the utility
 to vote function).
 
 In theory the vote would be defined by the person who submits the
 voting method.
 
    Raphfrk
 --------------------
 Interesting site
 "what if anyone could modify the laws"
 
 www.wikocracy.com   
 
  
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