[EM] Sainte-Lague addenda
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Wed Dec 6 18:10:17 PST 2006
I'd like to clarify a few things that need more explanation or emphasis:
1. Choice of electoral reforms
Single-winner reform is by far the most feasible reform for state and
national elections. State and national govt are the important govt, where
the important decisions are made. For that reason, in order to create
precedent for that important reform, I suggest that municipal electoral
reform efforts should be single-winner reform rather than PR, so that the
energy and money are spent on something that could quickly lead to
improvement, by giving precedent to the nationally winnable single-winner
reform.
For the same reason, I suggest that organizations and student govt, etc.,
should use and demonstrate better snigle-winner methods, because of the
value of creating precedent for those methods in govt elections.
2. Sainte-Lague rules for legal wording
In my one of my postings yesterday, I showed where Sainte-Lague's
odd-numbers formula comes from. But I neglected to state the odd numbers
rule, or the simpler version of it that I prefer:
1. Initially each party has zero seats
2. Divide each party's votes by its current number of seats plus .5 That's
that party's score.
3. Give a seat to the party with the largest score.
4. Repeat 2 and 3 till the desired total number of seats has been awarded.
The "odd numbers formula" merely doubles the number by which we divide.
Surely that's done in order to reduce the number of digits, so as to reduce
the pencil & paper calculation labor. But I claim that the greater
naturalness of the rules stated above is more important.
3. Demonstration of Sainte-Lague's transfer property
I apologize for the sloppiness of the demonstration that I posted. I didn't
want to make it any longer than it was. But I made it clear what I mean by
a party's "middle" (its quota allocation, before rounding); and what I mean
by the distance between parties or between a party and its middle (the
factor by which their v/s differ). Of course if we reduce a party's
difference from its middle, in terms of raw seat-count, then we also reduce
its distance from its middle, in terms of the factor by which its v/s
differs from the one corresponding to its middle. The v/s corresponding to a
party's middle is of course the quota that we used to calculate the
allocations.
Anyway, especially with those clarifications, my demonstration seems valid,
if not well-worded.
Mike Ossipoff
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