[EM] Reading rangevoting.org/VotMach.html paper ballots

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Thu Aug 3 06:35:50 PDT 2006


At 02:43 AM 8/3/2006, Anthony Duff wrote:
>The voter uses a computer (any old basic PC) to create a 
>ballot.  The ballot is
>then printed in a format suitable for scanning.  The computer keeps 
>no records.
>
>The voter takes the printed ballot, checks that it corresponds to 
>his intentions,
>and puts it into a ballot box.
>
>Subsequently (or immediately), the ballot is scanned.  The scanning computer
>counts the votes and the paper ballots are kept as the gold standard.

Some might object to "the computer keeps no records." But neither 
does a pencil keep records. The computer doesn't need to have any 
identifying information about the voter. It is really just a method 
of creating a filled-out ballot that is readable by both human and 
machine. The security and control is on the non-observability of the 
voter using the computer, the placing of the ballot into the ballot 
box, and the care and monitoring of the box to prevent tampering. The 
security problem with this is quite the same as the security problem 
with standard paper ballots.

Except that it might be possible to add additional security. Two 
copies of the ballot could be made, for example. One would go into 
the standard, to-be-counted ballot box, the other would go into a 
one-way box as a backup. The one-way box is only opened under court 
order, and is kept in a separate location from the to-be-counted 
ballots. (A one-way box is one which can accept insertions, but which 
does not allow removal of anything inserted without breaching the 
integrity of the box, including breaking seals.)

I like this idea because it would almost certainly eliminate the 
problem of spoiled ballots, exceptions would be extremely rare, for 
illegal or illegible ballots would be impossible to create. The 
computer might have a CD drive installed, it has no hard drive, only 
RAM, the CD drive and the computer case are sealed after the program 
CD is inserted. The program on the CD is public-source, and the CD 
can easily be verified to be a true copy. If the computer fails, 
there would be others available. Indeed, in a pinch, i.e., an 
extended power failure, there would be preprinted paper ballots 
available for hand marking.

This would also be extremely cheap. Essentially, the necessary 
computers are piling up in landfills everywhere. Laser printers could 
be borrowed for use in the election. The voter checks the ballot; 
approving that ballot and depositing it are the actual action of voting.

Now, this idea is not rocket science. Why, instead, is there all this 
move toward voting machines? I think that if you understand why you 
will also understand how deep is the systemic problem we face, and 
why the ultimate solution will come from outside the existing system.





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